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Ilan Wurman†
In the antebellum nineteenth century, courts often voided legislative acts for
substantive unreasonableness or for exceeding the scope of legitimate police powers.
Contrary to the assertions of a number of modern scholars, however, this tradition
does not support the concept of economic substantive due process. Courts voided municipal acts exceeding the scope of legitimate police powers on two grounds—the law
of delegation and the law of municipal corporations—that did not apply to acts of
state legislatures. The states themselves were limited to reasonable exercises of the
police power only when their asserted authority came into potential collision with
federal constitutional requirements, most prominently the Commerce and Contracts
Clauses.
It was only late in the century, after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, that a police-power version of substantive due process emerged as a limitation
on state legislatures as courts began conflating, under the guise of “due process of
law,” earlier doctrines that had used a similar vocabulary but for distinct purposes.
Police-power limitations on state legislatures regulating purely internal matters
therefore probably cannot be justified by any antebellum legal conception of due process of law. A police-power analysis might, however, play some role in a Privileges
or Immunities Clause challenge by analogy to antebellum Commerce Clause and
Contracts Clause jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
There has been renewed interest in recent years in the original understanding of “due process of law.” In a recent article, Professors Nathan Chapman and Michael McConnell argue that historically, due process meant only that an individual could not be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without a general and prospective standing law, the violation of which had been adjudicated according to a certain minimum of common-law judicial procedures.1 The state and federal due process and law of the land
clauses imposed no substantive limitations on Congress’s or a
state’s ability to legislate, except that they could not abrogate this
minimum of procedural protection. Professor Ryan Williams, on
the other hand, has argued that although before 1789 there was
no substantive component to due process, antebellum courts developed a body of substantive due process law prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment by which courts would guarantee unenumerated rights deemed fundamental from
1
Nathan S. Chapman and Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of
Powers, 121 Yale L J 1672, 1679 (2012). For an earlier textual analysis of the clause that
arrives at similar conclusions, see John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 Va L Rev 493, 504–34, 552–55 (1997).
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infringement by the state or federal governments.2 Several scholars have pointed to cases in which courts invalidated legislative
acts in excess of the police powers to regulate health, safety, and
morals.3 Last year, another scholar claimed that the framers of
2
Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 Yale L
J 408, 454–70 (2010).
3
Professor Howard Gillman argues in his book on the subject that a police-powers
jurisprudence “had been elaborated, clarified, and transformed into a workable set of doctrines by state court judges in the second quarter of the nineteenth century.” Howard
Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers
Jurisprudence 20 (Duke 1993). See also id at 10 (claiming that nineteenth-century judges
would “uphold legislation that (from their perspective) advanced the well-being of the community as a whole or promoted a true ‘public purpose,’” while they would “strike down
legislation that (from their perspective) was designed to advance the special or partial
interests of particular groups or classes”). Professor David Mayer argues that “[i]n protecting liberty of contract,” the Supreme Court was recognizing “the validity of the police
power in its traditional scope, as a protection of public health, safety, and morals,” and
basing its jurisprudence “on well-established principles of American constitutional law:
the use of the due process clauses, substantively, to protect property and liberty in all its
dimensions, by enforcing certain recognized limits on the states’ police power, limits that
had become federalized with the addition of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.” David N. Mayer, The Myth of “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”: Liberty of Contract
During the Lochner Era, 36 Hastings Const L Q 217, 284 (2009). See also David N. Mayer,
Substantive Due Process Rediscovered: The Rise and Fall of Liberty of Contract, 60 Mercer
L Rev 563, 571 (2009) (claiming there was a “long history of substantive due process protections for liberty and property rights—a body of law concerning constitutional limits on
government police powers that was well-established by the late nineteenth century,” and
that the Lochner-era Court “was merely enforcing these traditional constitutional limits on
the scope of the police power”); id at 585 (“American courts began applying the doctrine of
substantive due process much earlier, not long after adoption of the Constitution itself.”).
Professor David Bernstein argues that “the idea that the guarantee of ‘due process of
law’ regulates the substance of legislation . . . arose from the long-standing AngloAmerican principle that the government has inherently limited powers,” and from “longstanding American intellectual traditions that held that the government had no authority
to enforce arbitrary ‘class legislation’ or to violate the fundamental natural rights of the
American people.” David E. Bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner: Defending Individual
Rights Against Progressive Reform 9 (Chicago 2011). A few decades earlier, Professor
Bernard Siegan wrote that “[t]he evidence is very persuasive that Lochner was a legitimate interpretation of original meaning,” and that “[s]ubstantive due process was a very
viable concept among Justices of the US Supreme Court at the time the fourteenth amendment was framed and ratified,” pointing to a federal circuit court case in 1865 in which
the court “held that a Pennsylvania statute repealing a railroad corporation charter violated the due course of law provision of the state constitution.” Bernard H. Siegan, Rehabilitating Lochner, 22 San Diego L Rev 453, 454, 488 (1985), citing Baltimore v Pittsburgh
& Connellsville Railroad Co, 2 F Cases 570 (CC WD Pa 1865). Other scholars have found
the seeds of the police-power limitations on state governments in Justice Thomas Cooley’s
1868 treatise, contemporaneous with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
summarized antebellum state-court cases. See generally Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on
the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of the
American Union (Little, Brown 1868). See, for example, James W. Ely Jr, The Oxymoron
Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 Const Commen 315, 342–44 (1999); Timothy Sandefur, Privileges, Immunities, and Substantive Due
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the Fourteenth Amendment understood due process to protect
unwritten fundamental rights, including the right to contract and
acquire and possess property.4
Most recently, Professors Randy Barnett and Evan Bernick
have claimed that under an originalist interpretation of the federal Due Process Clauses, taking into account both their letter
and “spirit,” due process of law requires courts to examine state
legislative acts to determine whether they were enacted in a goodfaith pursuit of the legitimate ends of free government.5 This is so
because the purpose of due process was “barring ‘arbitrary’
power,”6 where “arbitrary” is defined “with reference to the ends
for which legitimate governments are established among men”as
well as “the means which the Constitution authorizes to effectuate
those ends.”7 Thus, courts must develop some kind of policepowers doctrine that takes into account the legitimate ends of
government and ensures that legislatures only enact laws in pursuit of those legitimate powers. They claim that “antebellum
courts repeatedly affirmed that legislative power was inherently
limited by the ends for which legitimate governments are
established.”8
Process, 5 NYU J L & Liberty 115, 154 (2010) (claiming that Cooley’s “famous treatise”
concluded that “the Due Process Clause protected substantive rights against unprincipled
or arbitrary legislation”); Williams, 120 Yale L J at 493–94 (cited in note 2). See also
note 35.
4
Kurt T. Lash, Enforcing the Rights of Due Process: The Original Relationship Between the Fourteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 106 Georgetown L J 1389,
1459–60, 1466–67 (2018).
5
Randy E. Barnett and Evan D. Bernick, No Arbitrary Power: An Originalist Theory
of the Due Process of Law, 60 Wm & Mary L Rev 1599, 1638 (2019) (“[I]mplementing the
Fourteenth Amendment does require a conception of the legitimate ends of government
that is consistent with the original function—the spirit—of the Due Process of Law Clause
in the Fourteenth Amendment; and it requires a doctrinal approach to give the text legal
effect today.”) See also id at 1661 (“In the case of states,” the “particular substantive limitations” are “to be found both in the texts of state constitutions and in the inherent limits
on all legislative power, whether or not such limits are expressly acknowledged in a state
constitution.”); id at 1662 (“[T]he substantive protection from arbitrary power provided by
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause would be empty without an implementing construction of the appropriate ends of state power, against which an act of
the legislature can be evaluated.”) (citation omitted).
6
Id at 1643.
7
Id at 1644–45.
8
Id at 1636. In this regard, they follow in the footsteps of those who have argued
that the Founders expected unwritten fundamental principles to be sources of constitutional authority in addition to the Constitution’s written text. See generally, for example,
Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U Chi L Rev 1127 (1987). The
difference is that Barnett and Bernick seek to root those fundamental principles in the
written text itself.
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In the nineteenth century, courts often invalidated legislative
acts in excess of what became known as the police powers. But
none of the cases regularly cited by scholars supports the substantive due process thesis. Instead, closer examination of the cases
reveals that antebellum courts applied a series of sometimes overlapping but distinct doctrines involving the police powers of legislative bodies. These were principally three in number.
First, state courts routinely invalidated municipal bylaws for
being “unreasonable” or in excess of the police powers to regulate
for the health, safety, and morals of the local citizenry.9 They did
so because municipalities exercised only those police powers expressly delegated by the state, and their powers were thus strictly
construed and impliedly limited to those that genuinely advanced
the health, safety, and morals of the local population. Additionally, these towns and cities were municipal corporations, and the
courts subjected them to the common law of corporations. According to this common law, courts could void corporate acts if they
were unreasonable, contrary to the general good of the corporation, or in restraint of trade. Neither rationale applied, nor did
courts apply them, to acts of the state legislatures themselves, at
least not in any of the cases that have been generally cited.
Second, federal courts sometimes invalidated state legislative acts affecting interstate or foreign commerce if they were not
genuinely for a police-power purpose and thereby impermissibly
interfered with such commerce.10 Such legislative acts not genuinely for police-power purposes were deemed to contravene the
federal commerce power, not any substantive rights guaranteed
by the Due Process Clause, which of course did not apply to the
states. This rationale for limiting the exercise of state power
therefore did not apply to acts of state legislatures regulating
solely internal commerce or local matters.
Third, courts invalidated both state and municipal acts that
impaired the obligations of contract. States and localities could,
however, reasonably regulate existing contractual obligations if
genuinely for police-power purposes.11 As with the negative Commerce Clause doctrine, this contracts doctrine was a court-created
accommodation between the imperatives of the federal Constitution, which prohibited states from impairing contractual obligations, and the need for the states to be able to regulate their
9
10
11

See Part I.A.
See Part I.B.
See Part I.C.

820

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:815

internal police, which by necessity reached both property and contract rights.
If no impairment of existing contractual obligations was at
issue and no regulation of interstate commerce was attempted,
there appears to have been no doctrine known to the law by which
courts could prevent a state legislature from enacting legislation
contrary to natural principles of justice or to fundamental rights
but that violated no state constitutional provision. At most, “substantive due process” in the sense of limiting the reach of state
power even over purely internal matters appears to have been deployed by some courts as a rule of statutory construction, by
which they would presume the legislature intended to depart
from fundamental maxims of free government as little as possible.12 It was not until after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment that courts in the 1870s began inferring and imposing substantive due process limitations upon the state legislatures.13
There are many reasons why the courts may have begun to
do so in this era. The courts may have become familiar with judicial enforceability of the public use requirement in the takings
context,14 and they may have believed that the Privileges or Immunities Clause would itself have imposed such limits had it not
been written out of the Constitution by the Slaughter-House
Cases.15 (Indeed, as I suggest in Part IV, some such limits may be
justified by that clause.16) The intellectual environment of the
1870s through the first decade of the 1900s, marked by classical
liberalism and “laissez faire capitalism,” also surely contributed.17

12

See Part II.C.
See Part III.
14 Professor Harry Scheiber claimed that the “confluence of [the] legal concepts” of
“vested rights, eminent domain and police powers of the state . . . would occur repeatedly
in nineteenth-century cases.” Harry N. Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and
the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts, in Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn,
eds, 5 Perspectives in American History 329, 339 (Warren Center 1971); id at 374–76, 381–
82 (commenting on the overlap between eminent domain and police powers).
15 83 US (16 Wall) 36 (1872). See Stephen F. Williams, “Liberty” in the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: The Framers’ Intentions, 53 U Colo L
Rev 117, 118–19 (1981).
16 See Part IV.
17 As Professor Clyde Jacobs observed:
13

The development of the liberty of contract as a limitation upon the powers of
both the state and the national governments was a judicial answer to the demands of industrialists in the period of business expansion following the Civil
War. It constituted judicial acceptance of the economic theory of laissez faire and
of the philosophic ideal of individualism.
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It is the contention here that at least one important cause of the
emergence of a police-powers version of substantive due process
in the 1870s was nothing other than a mistaken understanding of
its historical antecedents—the conflation of a number of doctrines
that all spoke in the vocabulary of the police powers, but which
had distinct purposes. As recently as 2016, one substantive due
process scholar observed that “no one has yet well explained how
police powers, an un-enumerated powers doctrine, came to play
such a large role in American constitutional jurisprudence.”18 The
history traced here suggests one possible explanation.
Some important clarifications are in order. Many proponents
of substantive due process cite cases for a very narrow understanding that the clause prohibited legislatures from enacting insufficiently general laws or from directly depriving someone of
vested liberty or property rights.19 As Chapman and McConnell
explain, these cases are consistent with the view that due process
is fundamentally a separation of powers provision requiring a
prospective and general law, the violation of which has been
properly adjudicated, before an individual can be deprived of life,
liberty, or property.20 Similarly, some scholars describe the Due
Process Clause as “substantive” because it limits legislative
power as well as judicial power—as it assuredly does by prohibiting the legislature from reducing the procedural minimum.21 The
dispute today is not over these concepts. Whether they are aptly
described as “substantive” as opposed to “procedural” is of little
Clyde E. Jacobs, Law Writers and the Courts: The Influence of Thomas M. Cooley,
Christopher G. Tiedeman, and John F. Dillon upon American Constitutional Law 24 (California 1954). See also Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation
of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 L & Hist Rev 293, 293–
98 (1985) (describing the conventional wisdom about this period, although challenging it);
Mayer, 36 Hastings Const L Q at 217–22 (cited in note 3) (same).
18 David E. Bernstein, The History of “Substantive” Due Process: It’s Complicated, 95
Tex L Rev See Also 1, 3 (2016).
19 See, for example, James W. Ely Jr, The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of Property Rights 79 (Oxford 3d ed 2008) (describing as a “substantive
interpretation[ ] of due process” the invalidation of “legislative attempts to transfer private property from one party to another”); Williams, 120 Yale L J at 423–27 (cited in
note 2) (providing a taxonomy of different versions of substantive due process); id at 460–
77 (analyzing cases supporting the general law and vested rights reading of due process).
20 Chapman and McConnell, 121 Yale L J at 1726–73 (cited in note 1).
21 Mayer describes any restriction imposed by due process and law of the land clauses
on legislation to be “substantive.” Mayer, 60 Mercer L Rev at 586–87 (cited in note 3). See
also, for example, Siegan, 22 San Diego L Rev at 488–89 (cited in note 3) (suggesting that
by operating “directly in limitation and restraint of the legislative powers conferred by the
Constitution,” the Due Process Clause was substantive), quoting Hepburn v Griswold, 75
US (8 Wall) 603, 624 (1869).
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concern. The question rather is whether the guarantee of due process of law allowed courts to strike down legislative acts inconsistent with unwritten fundamental rights.
One might think that none of this history matters for modern
law. Yet at a minimum it matters to the debates over interpretive
methodology—both those internal to originalism, the idea that
the Constitution ought to be interpreted with its original meaning,22 and those external to it. Barnett and Bernick’s recent work,
for example, demonstrates significant disagreement among
originalists themselves over methodology. Do originalists merely
look to the original public meaning of the words—do they stop at
“interpretation”—or must they resort to “construction” if the constitutional provisions prove to be too open-ended? And if the latter, are the historical constructions of prior generations relevant
to the question of what constructions to adopt in modern times?23
The historical evidence here suggests that the distinction between interpretation and construction may not do much work in
the context of due process because the due process concept was
not as broad and open-ended as the substantive due process thesis suggests.
This history may also matter to modern law more directly.
The cases suggest that, historically, states were limited to goodfaith and legitimate exercises of their police powers when state
power ran up against potential federal constitutional prohibitions. After the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the states
became subject to new federal constitutional prohibitions, namely

22 For some summaries of originalism and the current state of the debate, see Ilan
Wurman, A Debt Against the Living: An Introduction to Originalism 11–21, 25–44, 84–96
(Cambridge 2017). See also generally Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 Fordham L Rev 375 (2013). For a summary of the debates internal to originalism, which arguably weaken originalism’s claim to legitimacy, see generally Thomas B.
Colby and Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 Duke L J 239 (2009).
23 Barnett and Bernick look not only to the letter, but also to the “spirit” of the constitutional provisions. See Barnett and Bernick, 60 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1605 (cited in
note 5). They explain that nineteenth-century courts “constructed” the police-powers doctrine because due process of law had come to be “understood to impose limits on the ends
which state legislatures could pursue.” Id at 1631 (emphasis in original). They conclude
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not “compel[ ]” this precise police-power doctrine—
because it is a construction—but that the Amendment requires some “conception of the
legitimate ends of government that is consistent with the original function—the spirit—of
the Due Process of Law Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id at 1638. In contrast,
Professors John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport claim that the legal methods in use at
the Founding saw no distinction between interpretation and construction. See John O.
McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 Nw U L Rev 751, 772–80 (2009).
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the Privileges or Immunities Clause and a variety of incorporated
rights. Although police powers may not be relevant to due process
(or so I argue), they very well may be relevant to a proper analysis
of these new federal constitutional prohibitions. The Privileges or
Immunities Clause, for example, provides that no state shall
“abridge” the privileges or immunities of citizenship.24 This provision thus directly limits the states, just as do the Contracts and
Commerce Clauses. Whatever the clause forbids—whether
abridgement of fundamental rights generally, or only unequal
state legislation—a defense against a Privileges or Immunities
Clause claim could be that the state was not “abridging” such privileges or immunities but was rather acting pursuant to its proper
police powers. This argument would work by analogy to the antebellum Commerce Clause and Contracts Clause jurisprudence.25
The same kind of analysis might apply to incorporated rights,
too, and in fact appears to have been the Supreme Court’s framework in First Amendment cases in the first few decades after that
amendment was incorporated. And, now that the Supreme Court
has heard a Second Amendment case26 for the first time since that
amendment was incorporated,27 the police-powers framework
could supply the Court with a framework for such cases, too.
This Article unfolds as follows. Part I traces the history of
police-power limitations on municipal corporations and states,
surveying the municipal corporations, commerce, and contracts
cases. It ends with a brief discussion of the provenance and implications of the two famous (or infamous) historical exceptions to
my claim of which I am aware, Dred Scott v Sandford28 and
Wynehamer v People.29
Part II examines Michigan Supreme Court Justice Thomas
Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations30 treatise to support these
conclusions. Cooley’s textbook is particularly important because
it was published contemporaneously with the adoption of the

24

US Const Amend XIV, § 1, cl 2.
See Part IV.
26 New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc v City of New York, 883 F3d 45 (2d
Cir 2018), cert granted, 139 S Ct 939 (2019).
27 See McDonald v City of Chicago, 561 US 742, 791 (2010) (Alito) (plurality) (“[T]he
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment
right recognized in Heller.”).
28 60 US (19 How) 393 (1857).
29 13 NY 378 (1856).
30 See generally Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations (cited in note 3).
25

824

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:815

Fourteenth Amendment,31 and his treatise was well known and
well received32 because no one had previously compiled such a
thorough set of state constitutional cases.33 As we shall see, the
Supreme Court and litigants before it relied on Cooley after the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.34 Cooley’s text is also
important because almost all proponents of substantive due
process rely heavily on statements from Cooley as supporting
the existence of antebellum substantive due process.35 Yet,
31 Originalists generally look to evidence nearest in time to the enactment of a particular constitutional provision. Consider, for example, Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv L Rev 1409, 1513
(1990) (“None of these decisions was handed down within twenty years of the first amendment, and they are therefore weak indicators of the original understanding.”).
32 See, for example, Ely, 16 Const Commen at 342 (cited in note 3) (describing Cooley
as “the most influential constitutional writer of the late nineteenth century”); Mayer, 36
Hastings Const L Q at 233 n 71 (cited in note 3) (describing Cooley’s treatise as “the most
influential constitutional law treatise in the nineteenth century”); Williams, 120 Yale L J at
493 (cited in note 2) (describing Cooley as “[b]y far the most influential of the early post-Civil
War commentators to address the meaning of due process and law-of-the-land provisions”).
33 See Jacobs, Law Writers and the Courts at 29–30 (cited in note 17):

Why did Cooley’s treatise surpass even those of Kent and Story in prestige and
authority? . . . First, [it] was the first systematic work of merit in the field of
state constitutional law. It served, as no previous work had done, to bring order
out of the confusion inherent in having a large number of separate, although
basically similar, constitutional systems. It soon became the ready-made reference work, the hand-book, of lawyers and judges. Second, the fact that the treatise, as its title indicates, emphasized limitations upon power rather than power
itself made it readily compatible with prevailing economic and political ideas of
the time.
34

See Part III.
Professor James Ely argues that Cooley “embraced a substantive understanding
of due process in his landmark work,” explaining that due process “was intended to safeguard individuals from the arbitrary exercise of governmental power.” Ely, 16 Const Commen at 342 (cited in note 3). Williams argues that “Cooley’s focus on the legitimacy of the
legislature’s objectives and the means pursued to attain those objectives corresponds
closely with the police powers version of due process that predominated during the
Lochner era,” and that “Cooley is frequently credited as one of the principal intellectual
forerunners of Lochner-era substantive due process jurisprudence.” Williams, 120 Yale L
J at 494 (cited in note 2). Mayer cites Cooley for the proposition that “state courts in the
nineteenth century understood the general regulatory power of the states known as the
‘police power’ to be broad but certainly not unlimited.” Mayer, 36 Hastings Const L Q at
233 & n 71 (cited in note 3). He also argues that Cooley’s treatise defined the police power
as the general regulatory power of the state to “insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own so far as is reasonably consistent with a like enjoyment of the rights by
others.” Id at n 71, quoting Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 704 (Little, Brown 6th ed 1890). And Gillman extensively discusses Cooley for the proposition that
states could only interfere with property rights if genuinely for police-power purposes. See
Gillman, The Constitution Besieged at 56–59 (cited in note 3). See also, for example,
Sandefur, 5 NYU J L & Liberty at 154 (cited in note 3) (claiming that Cooley’s “famous
35
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quite the opposite is true. Part II, in short, seeks to rehabilitate
Cooley.36
Part III will trace the emergence of substantive due process
in the conflation of these distinct strands of legal doctrine in the
federal cases interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment after the
Slaughter-House Cases, culminating in Lochner v New York.37 It
concludes that economic substantive due process cannot be supported on the basis of the antebellum antecedents on which the
Supreme Court purported to rely.
Part IV suggests, however, that the police powers could be
relevant to a proper analysis of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause and also of incorporated rights. Whether one adopts the
fundamental rights reading or the equality reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, a state may, by analogy to Contracts
and Commerce Clause jurisprudence, be able to defend against a
claim of “abridgement” on the ground that it was pursuing a legitimate police-power interest. The same kind of defense could
also be made by a state defending against a claim that it has violated an incorporated right. This Part illustrates these possibilities through a reexamination of the Slaughter-House Cases and
early post-incorporation First Amendment cases.
I. THE ANTEBELLUM LEGAL DOCTRINES
The police powers featured in three antebellum doctrines:
municipal corporations were limited to reasonable regulations for
genuine police-power purposes, states were limited to genuine
police-power regulations that affected interstate commerce, and
both state and local governments could not impair existing contractual obligations except for genuine police-power reasons. The
police-power cases generally cited by scholars fall into one of these
three categories, none of which appears to support substantive
due process of the kind advanced by the Supreme Court after the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment or by some modern
scholars.

treatise” concluded that “the Due Process Clause protected substantive rights against unprincipled or arbitrary legislation”).
36 The title of this Part is inspired by Siegan’s “Rehabilitating Lochner” article, as
well as Bernstein’s Rehabilitating Lochner. See generally Siegan, 22 San Diego L Rev 453
(cited in note 3); Bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner (cited in note 3).
37 198 US 45 (1905). See also Part III.A. Lochner, of course, is the most infamous
case of the bunch—the case striking down a state law limiting the number of hours that
bakers could work. Lochner, 198 US at 45–46, 57–58.
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The Police Powers of Municipal Corporations

In the antebellum period, most legislation regulating the
health, safety, welfare, and morals of the people was made at the
local level by cities, towns, and boroughs. By the time of the Civil
War, a large body of law had developed governing the appropriate
use of local legislation and the judicial review of such legislation.
The treatises and cases focus on two general principles. First, municipalities could exercise only those powers expressly delegated
to them by the state legislatures, or those necessarily implied or
incidental. Second, courts could review municipal acts for reasonableness, to ensure they were not in restraint of trade, and to ensure they were genuinely intended to advance the purposes of the
municipal corporation—that is, their police-power purposes—just
as courts reviewed the acts of private corporations.
Notably, many of the cases involved matters that to this day
create controversy. One example is the regulation of interment
practices, which was recently at issue in a case from Louisiana.38
Another is the regulation of slaughterhouses, including the creation of monopolies—the very issue at the heart of the SlaughterHouse Cases.39 Courts reviewed these regulations to determine if
they were reasonable, consistent with the police powers, and not
in restraint of trade. But if a state permitted a municipal corporation to create any particular regulation or even monopoly expressly—or if the state did so itself—there does not appear to
have been any doctrine courts could employ to ensure the reasonableness of such laws or ordinances, nor their consistency with a
proper use of the police power.
1. State-court cases.
One of the most lucid and thorough cases from the antebellum period is City of St. Paul v Laidler40 out of Minnesota. The
city enacted an ordinance prohibiting the sale or exposure for sale
of fresh meat at any time and place except in the public market.41
The city would rent out stalls in the public market to the highest

38 St. Joseph Abbey v Castille, 712 F3d 215, 217 (5th Cir 2013). In one of the few
successful economic substantive due process challenges since the New Deal, the Fifth Circuit struck down a Louisiana licensing scheme creating exclusive privileges for funeral
homes to create and sell caskets. Id at 217.
39 See Part IV.B.
40 2 Minn 190 (1858).
41 Id at 201–02.
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bidder, with a minimum rent established by the ordinance.42 The
city’s charter expressly granted it the power to “establish a public
market,” to “make rules and regulations for the government of the
same,” and to “license and regulate butcher stall shops.”43
The state supreme court first explained that municipal corporations were bodies of specifically delegated powers:
The City of Saint Paul is a municipal corporation, organized
and established to accomplish certain purposes and objects
particularly specified in its charter. The city government derives its power and authority to make and enforce laws for
the government of the city solely from the legislature. It is
entirely a creature of the Statute and in the exercise of its
authority cannot exceed the limits therein prescribed. It is a
body of special and limited jurisdiction; its powers cannot be
extended by intendment or implication, but must be confined
within the express grant of the legislature.44
Municipal corporations are organized and established for “certain
purposes and objects,” usually defined expressly in the corporate
charter.45 Moreover, the court went on, such power must be exercised reasonably:
[N]ot only so, but this power must be exercised reasonably
and in sound discretion, and strictly within the limits of the
Charter, and in perfect subordination to the Constitution and
general laws of the land, and the rights dependent thereon
and where the Charter enables a company or corporation to
make by-laws (or ordinances) in certain cases and for certain
purposes, its power of legislation is limited to the cases and
objects specified; all others being excluded by implication.46
The court explained that “[i]ncidental to the ordinary powers
of a public municipal corporation” is the “power of enacting sanitary regulations for the preservation of the lives and health of
those residing within its corporate limits,” but that the corporation must “exercise no power further than may be necessary to
attain it.”47 In particular, all sides agreed that if the ordinance

42
43
44
45
46
47

Id at 201–03.
Id at 203, quoting St. Paul City Charter §§ 18–19 (1858).
Laidler, 2 Minn at 203.
Id.
Id at 204 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Id.
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were a restraint of trade rather than a mere regulation of trade,
it would be void.48
The court concluded that the ordinance was void for being in
restraint of trade, unreasonable, and contrary to the purposes of
the corporation.49 The ordinance could not be sustained as necessary for sanitation because no such necessity justified granting a
public monopoly to certain sellers only.50 Further, there were no
rules confining the discretion of the public officials who granted
the licenses to sell; they “might be granted only to political partizans, or personal friends.”51 Thus, the power to license could be
exercised “arbitrarily or unreasonably.”52
The court also concluded that the ordinance was not for the
common benefit of the people, noting that it was “difficult to see
how such an ordinance can operate for the common benefit, or the
benefit of any one save the corporation; for its legitimate effect
must be, to increase the price of the commodity sold in proportion
to the restrictions imposed upon those engaged in the trade,” and
thus the ordinance “must operate not only to the prejudice of the
butchers but also to that of the citizens in general.”53 The court,
in its penultimate paragraph, thus found that the ordinance was
“in restraint of trade,” “unreasonable,” not genuinely for policepower purposes, and in violation of the state’s delegation of power
to the corporation:
[T]he ordinance . . . cannot be sustained upon principle or authority. And, while the right is conceded to municipal corporations to adopt such regulations as may be necessary and
reasonable, to protect the lives, health, property or morals of
its citizens, the exercise of this right should be carefully
guarded, and limited within the clear intent of the grant of
power for such purpose; and, where a question arises as to
any particular ordinance which it is claimed interferes with
the rights of individuals as enjoyed under the common law or
by statute, the burden of proof should be on the corporation
to show that it has not exceeded its authority in framing such
ordinance.54
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

Laidler, 2 Minn at 203–05.
Id at 209.
Id at 205.
Id at 206.
Laidler, 2 Minn at 209.
Id at 209.
Id.
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Numerous cases from the antebellum period hold similarly.
The rationale, as appears from the above case, is partly a theory
of delegation from the state. One justice in North Carolina explained, “To this [corporate] body a portion of the power of the
legislature is delegated to be exercised for the public good, and
subject at all times to be modified, changed, or annulled.”55 Another rationale was the applicability of the common law of corporations. Chief Justice John Savage of New York’s Supreme Court
of Judicature explained, “At common law corporations have
power to make by-laws for the general good of the corporation.
They must be reasonable and for the common benefit; they must
not be in restraint of trade, nor impose a burden without an apparent benefit.”56 The only question in that case, which involved
a municipal bylaw, was therefore whether that bylaw was valid
pursuant to those principles.57 “The authority of the corporation
is a limited one,” an earlier New York case explained.58 “The trustees cannot arbitrarily pass what laws they please. Their laws are
to be prudential; and aimed at the correction of some probable
evil. This is also conformable to the general law of corporations,
which demands that their by-laws should be reasonable.”59
Perhaps Chief Justice John Marshall best gave expression to
both of these grounds, with his usual clarity and concision: “Being
the mere creature of law, [a corporation] possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either
expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as
are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was
created.”60 Judge John F. Dillon’s 1872 treatise on municipal corporations—which we shall discuss in more detail presently—explained that these principles were applicable to “private as well
as public or municipal” corporations.61 Thus, in 1854 one corporations treatise writer wrote that the bylaws of municipal corporations must be “reasonable and adapted to the purposes of the
corporation.”62

55

Mills v Williams, 33 NC (11 Ired) 558, 561 (1850).
Village of Buffalo v Webster, 10 Wend 100, 102 (NY 1833).
57 Id.
58 Dunham v Trustees of the Village of Rochester, 5 Cow 462, 465 (NY 1826).
59 Id (emphasis added).
60 Trustees of Dartmouth College v Woodward, 17 US (4 Wheat) 518, 636 (1819).
61 John F. Dillon, Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations 27–28 (Cockcroft &
Co 1872).
62 James Grant, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Corporations in General, as Well
Aggregate as Sole 86 (T. & J.W. Johnson 1854).
56
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These principles were applied by the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts in 1834 to invalidate a bylaw in Charlestown
that entirely prohibited the bringing of dead bodies into the town
without the approval of a majority of the selectmen, and further
prohibited them from burying any dead body in the town without
the approval of the same.63 The first ordinance was struck down
for being outside the scope of the corporation’s delegated power
because “[t]here is nothing in the language of the statute, from
which it can be inferred, that it was the intention of the legislature to delegate to the selectmen and town of Charlestown the
power of imposing upon the citizens of the Commonwealth such
an unreasonable restraint.”64
The second ordinance respecting the burial of the dead, however, was struck down on other grounds. The statute authorized
the municipal corporation “to make and establish rules, orders,
and regulations for the interment of the dead in said town, to establish the police of the burying-grounds, to make regulations for
funerals, and to appoint all necessary officers to carry the same
into effect.”65 The court first held that the bylaw was not merely a
regulation, but a complete prohibition. Indeed, it appears to have
been the intent of the town to prohibit all Catholic burials.66
The court also held that even if such a bylaw were a regulation and not a complete prohibition, it would still be void because
it was unreasonable and not genuinely for a police-power purpose.
“A by-law, to be valid, must be reasonable; it must be legi, fidei,
rationi consona,” the court observed. 67 Thus, if this “regulation or
prohibition had been limited to the populous part of the town, and
were made in good faith for the purpose of preserving the health of
the inhabitants,” who may be exposed to disease as a result of interments in densely populated areas, then “it would have been a
very reasonable regulation.”68 But because the “restraints extend
63

Austin v Murray, 33 Mass (16 Pick) 121, 124 (1834).
Id. Here, the court adds: “[N]or had the legislature any right or authority to delegate any such power.” Id. There are no citations for this proposition, and it appears to have
been a minority view. Indeed, numerous cases held that a state could ratify unreasonable
ordinances or explicitly delegate the power to enact unreasonable ordinances. See notes
83–85, 98, and accompanying text. Even if it were true that the legislature had no power
to delegate to municipalities the authority to enact unreasonable regulations, that does
not support the proposition that the state itself could not have enacted the unreasonable
regulation.
65 Austin, 33 Mass (16 Pick) at 124.
66 Id at 124–25.
67 Id at 125.
68 Id (emphasis added).
64
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many miles into the country, to the utmost limits of the town,” it
could not “be pretended that this by-law was made for the preservation of the health of the inhabitants.”69 “[S]uch an unnecessary
restraint upon the right of interring the dead,” the justices concluded, “we think essentially unreasonable.”70
Here we see a hint of the kind of language that would become
a staple of police-power limitations against the states in the 1870s
and after. It was the duty of courts, at least when reviewing municipal acts, to ensure that they were “made in good faith for the
purpose of” genuinely advancing the health, safety, welfare, or
morals of the people.71 Numerous other cases from the period,
from numerous states, adopted these same principles.72
2. Dillon on municipal corporations.
The earliest synthesis of the antebellum cases appears to be
Judge Dillon’s Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations,
published in 1872. Dillon was a judge of the US Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit at the time he published the treatise, and
had been a justice of the Iowa Supreme Court for half a decade in
the 1860s.73 His treatise is of particular interest not only because
69
70
71
72

Austin, 33 Mass (16 Pick) at 125.
Id.
Id.
See, for example, Waters v Leech, 3 Ark 110, 114–15 (1840):

The corporation of the city of Little Rock possesses only such legislative powers
as are prescribed by the charter from which it derives its existence. It exercises
a delegated power only; and must in all its acts, confine itself strictly within the
limits of its authority. . . . The power to make by-laws is given to corporate bodies
to enable them to fulfil the purposes of the institution, and must necessarily be
confined to such objects and persons as are specially defined in the charter. The
corporate powers are not only limited, but must be reasonably exercised in sound
discretion, and not only strictly within the limits of the charter, but in perfect
subordination to the constitution and the general law of the land, and the rights
dependent thereon; and that power, if properly exercised, may be enforced by
just and competent penalties.
See also Borough of Greensburg v Young, 53 Pa 280, 283 (1866):
There is nothing therefore to restrain the authorities in regard to these rules,
regulations and ordinances which they make on the subject of the streets, but
the constitution and laws of the Commonwealth, and the common law, which
requires the by-laws of the corporation to be reasonable and not a burden, without some fair equivalent.
For an account of the broad police powers exercised by municipalities, see generally
William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America (UNC 3d ed 1996).
73 Harry Hubbard, John F. Dillon: Fourteenth President of Association, 14 ABA
J 77 (1928).
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it supports the above analysis on a wider scale, but also for two
further reasons. First, as we shall see presently, his treatise
teems with suggestions that state legislatures were not limited
by the police powers the same way municipal corporations were
limited. Second, notwithstanding these suggestions, litigants before the Supreme Court cited Dillon’s treatise in the 1870s and
afterward for the proposition that states themselves were limited
by the police powers, an argument that appears to have persuaded some of the justices.
Dillon’s focus is primarily on the limited nature of a municipal corporation’s delegated powers. “The courts,” he wrote, have
the most important duty “to require these [municipal] corporations, in all cases, to show a plain and clear grant for the authority
they assume to exercise.”74 Municipal corporations “possess no
powers or faculties not conferred upon them, either expressly or
by fair implication, by the law which creates them, or other statutes applicable to them.”75
In addition to acting only pursuant to their delegated powers,
municipal corporations also had to act solely for the public benefit. “Municipal corporations are created and exist for the public
advantage, and not for the benefit of their officers or of particular
individuals or classes.”76 Many general state laws explicitly directed for this reason that any municipal act must be “necessary”
for the attainment of only certain enumerated objects.77 Dillon
cites numerous cases for this proposition. To take but one example, he cites Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for the proposition “that corporations can
only exercise their powers over their respective members, for the
accomplishment of limited and defined objects.”78 Thus, municipal

74

Dillon, Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations at 25 (cited in note 61).
Id at 29. See also id at 40 (when it comes to entering into municipal contracts,
“[t]he power of the majority is wisely limited by law to the objects and cases which are
clearly provided for and defined by statute”); id at 101–02 (asserting that it is a “general
and undisputed proposition” that a municipal corporation can exercise only powers that
are (1) “granted in express words,” (2) “necessarily or fairly implied in, or incident to, the
powers expressly granted,” or (3) “essential to the declared objects and purposes of the
corporation—not simply convenient, but indispensable”).
76 Id at 29.
77 See, for example, id at 34–35 n 1 (observing that Massachusetts’s general law permitted cities to make only those bylaws “necessary . . . for directing and managing the
prudential affairs, preserving the peace and good order, and maintaining the internal
police”).
78 Dillon, Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations at 102 (cited in note 61),
quoting Spaulding v Lowell, 40 Mass (23 Pick) 71, 74 (1839).
75
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bylaws and ordinances enacted pursuant to a general or implied
grant of power “must be reasonable” and “consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation.”79 Satisfaction of this
criterion is for the courts to judge: “Whether an ordinance be reasonable and consistent with the law or not, is a question for the
court”; “[a]n unreasonable by-law is void.”80 Courts, however,
must “cautiously” exercise this power because “city authorities, it
is to be presumed, can judge better than the court.”81
Judge Dillon’s synthesis thus supports the proposition that
courts could void municipal acts that were unreasonable, in restraint of trade, contrary to a delegation of power, or inconsistent
with the purposes of such a delegation. But, crucially, no such
doctrines would prevent a state legislature from exercising its
own powers unreasonably or in restraint of trade. Indeed, Judge
Dillon lamented that “[e]xtraordinary and extra-municipal powers have been too often incautiously or unwisely granted” by the
state legislatures to cities, and exhorted his readers that “[t]he
powers granted to such corporations, and especially the power to
levy taxes, should be more carefully defined and limited, and
should embrace such objects only as are necessary for the health,
welfare, safety, and convenience of the inhabitants.”82 This suggests his understanding that states ultimately could authorize local governments to act contrary to the genuine health, welfare,
safety, and convenience of citizens—even if the courts would invalidate an improper municipal act made pursuant to more general grants of authority.
Judge Dillon elsewhere makes this understanding explicit.
Under the heading, “Legislative Authority to Adopt Unreasonable
Ordinances,” he writes:
Where the legislature, in terms, confers upon a municipal
corporation the power to pass ordinances of a specified and
defined character, if the power thus delegated be not in conflict with the constitution, an ordinance passed pursuant
thereto cannot be impeached as invalid because it would have
been regarded as unreasonable if it had been passed under
the incidental power of the corporation, or under a grant of
79

Dillon, Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations at 278 (cited in note 61).
Id at 283.
81 Id at 283–84 n 3, citing Commonwealth v Robertson, 59 Mass (5 Cush) 438,
442 (1850).
82 Dillon, Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations at 23 (emphasis added)
(cited in note 61).
80
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power general in its nature. In other words, what the legislature distinctly says may be done cannot be set aside by the
courts because they may deem it unreasonable.83
Only “where the power to legislate on a given subject is conferred, but the mode of its exercise is not prescribed, then the ordinance passed in pursuance thereof must be a reasonable exercise of the power, or it will be pronounced invalid.”84 Put simply,
if the legislature explicitly granted a municipal corporation the
power to do an unreasonable act, it was not for the courts to question it.85
One illustrative case involving slaughterhouses—a case with
very similar facts to those in the Slaughter-House Cases, and cited
there by counsel and the dissenters86—was City of Chicago v
Rumpff,87 decided the year before the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Chicago granted a ten-year monopoly starting in
83

Id at 284 (emphasis added).
Id.
85 The two cases Judge Dillon cited for this proposition do not make the point quite
so explicitly, but they do support it. See id at 284. In City of Peoria v Calhoun, 29 Ill 317
(1862), the Illinois Supreme Court held to be erroneous an instruction to the jury that
seemed to suggest that a restraint of trade was unlawful even if the municipal corporation
had been granted the power to enact such a restraint. Id at 320. “This was virtually telling
the jury,” the court observed, “that although the city had the right to pass the ordinance,
yet if they believed it was in restraint of lawful trade, it was not binding. If the city had
power to pass the ordinance, then no trade in violation of it could be lawful.” Id.
The Minnesota Supreme Court in City of St. Paul v Colter, 12 Minn 41 (1866), was
more explicit. The state legislature authorized the city to regulate the sale of meat and to
require a license to be purchased at a price anywhere from $5 to $500. Id at 46–47. The
defendant argued that an ordinance imposing a $200 license fee was “unauthorized and
void, and oppressive and in restraint of trade”; that the corporation’s powers “are confined
to sanitary and police regulations”; and, most importantly, that “[t]he legislature of the
State cannot authorize a corporation to pass by-laws, save only such as are reasonable.”
Id at 43–44. The court had no trouble rejecting the argument: “What limits should be imposed upon the licensing power, was a matter for the legislature to determine,—a matter
dependent upon the judgment and discretion of the legislature. In such case we do not
think it proper to question the exercise of legislative discretion.” Id at 48. The court emphasized that the ordinance in that case was “authorized by the legislature,” and “not
being forbidden by the constitution, it is therefore not void, but has the force of law; and if
it be oppressive, the remedy, as in many other cases, lies with the legislature or common
council.” Id at 49 (emphasis in original). Because the ordinance was within the corporation’s explicitly delegated power, the ordinance was presumed valid, and the presumption
could not be overcome “by any thing going to show that the imposition of the license [was]
. . . not warranted by . . . the legitimate purposes for which such charters may be granted.”
Id. An authorization by the state legislature insulated a municipal act that might otherwise have been invalid under the police-powers analysis.
86 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) at 48; id at 106–07 (Field dissenting). See
also Part IV.B.2.
87 45 Ill 90 (1867).
84
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1866 to one particular company over all slaughtering in the city
pursuant to a grant of power in its charter to “direct the location,
management and construction of, and to regulate, license, restrain, abate and prohibit [slaughtering establishments] within
the city.”88 The state legislature attempted to ratify the contract
in 1867 by amending the charter to provide the city with “power
and authority to regulate and control the slaughtering of all animals in the city, or within four miles thereof, intended for consumption or exposed for sale in the city, and to enforce, by additional ordinances, any regulation, contract or law heretofore
made on the subject.”89
The Illinois Supreme Court struck down the ordinance.90
“Municipal corporations are only created for the better government and protection of local communities in the enjoyment of
their rights, than can be afforded by general laws,” the court observed.91 “Such bodies are never created to enable them to confer
pecuniary benefits, or to grant monopolies to any portion of community, or to individual members thereof.”92 They are created “for
the regulation of the local police; to adopt and enforce all needful
sanitary regulations; to establish and control markets; to repair
highways, and perform the various other duties necessary to promote the comfort and well being of such densely crowded communities as constitute large cities.”93 But, the court went on to say,
it is no part of the design, in organizing such bodies, that the
corporate authorities shall enter into competition with its inhabitants in business or trade, or to sell, or even grant, special immunities to any portion of the inhabitants for their individual benefit or gain. The corporate authorities must
exercise their franchises solely for the benefit of the community embraced within their limits.94
Here the court clearly stated both the evils of monopoly and
the limitations upon a municipal corporation’s exercise of its police powers. Such powers must be exercised for the benefit of the
whole and not for the private advantage of a select few. The ends
pursued must be legitimately for the safety and health of the
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Id at 92–95.
Id at 95, quoting Chicago City Charter, ch v, § 24 (1867).
Rumpff, 45 Ill at 97–98.
Id at 96.
Id.
Id.
Rumpff, 45 Ill at 96.
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community. “Hence their by-laws must be reasonable, and such
as are vexatious, unequal or oppressive, or are manifestly injurious to the interest of the corporation, are void, and of the same
character are all by-laws in restraint of trade, or which necessarily tend to create a monopoly.”95
The court also rejected the state legislature’s attempt to ratify this unreasonable ordinance because the legislature had not
done so expressly. “[I]nasmuch as this contract is not specifically
named,” the court held, “we cannot presume that the legislature
intended to ratify an unreasonable and oppressive contract, but
only such as was in accordance with the purposes for which the
charter had been granted, and not those which were opposed to
the design of creating such bodies.”96
This holding implies two important points. First, it appears
that the court was prepared to presume the legislature did not act
unreasonably or contrary to legitimate police-power purposes. As
we shall see, this was consistent with other courts using a version
of what we might today call substantive due process as a rule of
statutory construction.97 But, second, it seems that the court
would not have struck down an express ratification of the unreasonable ordinance.98 In sum, Dillon and the antebellum cases uniformly maintained that, absent an express authorization to the
contrary, municipal corporations were limited to reasonable exercises of the police powers under the law of delegation and the law
of corporations. State legislatures, however, do not appear to have
been limited in this same way.

95 Id at 97. The court articulated what would have made such an ordinance a valid
exercise of the police power: “Where that body have made the necessary regulations required for the health or comfort of the inhabitants, all persons inclined to pursue such an
occupation should have the opportunity of conforming to such regulations, otherwise the
ordinance would be unreasonable and tend to oppression.” Id. In other words, a regulation
of slaughterhouses would have been legitimate so long as anyone in the occupation had a
fair chance of conforming to the regulations. “We regard it neither as a regulation nor a
license of the business,” on the other hand, “to confine it to one building, or to give it to
one individual. Such action is oppressive, and creates a monopoly that never could have
been contemplated by the general assembly.” Id at 98. It cuts others “off from a share in
not only a legal but a necessary business.” Id. Thus, whether the court considered the city’s
act to be an ordinance or a contract (which was at issue in the case), “it is equally unauthorized, as being opposed to the rules governing the adoption of municipal by-laws.” Id.
96 Id at 98–99.
97 See Part II.C.
98 Dillon elsewhere states that when “an ordinance is unreasonable, [it] can only be
passed when clearly authorized.” Dillon, Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations at
333 (cited in note 61), citing Waters v Leech, 3 Ark 110 (1840).
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Police Powers and State Regulations of Commerce

The state legislatures may not have been limited to reasonable exercises of their police powers as a general matter, but they
were so limited when their exercise of power came into potential
collision with specific federal constitutional provisions.
One such provision was the prohibition on state regulations
of interstate commerce under the exclusive reading of the Commerce Clause. One of the pressing constitutional questions of the
era was whether the commerce power was exclusive and prohibited state regulations of interstate commerce and, if it was exclusive, whether that also prohibited state health and safety regulations that affected interstate commerce. In these cases, the police
powers did serve as a limitation on the states. The Court allowed
states to regulate articles of interstate commerce only if their regulations were genuinely for police-power purposes.99
1. Gibbons v Ogden (1824).
Our story begins with a prominent case of early constitutional law, Gibbons v Ogden.100 The facts are familiar. Ogden was
the assignee of exclusive licenses to navigate state waters by
steamboat granted by the state legislature of New York, and
Gibbons was licensed under an act of Congress to engage in the
“coasting trade.”101 Ogden sued Gibbons for violating Ogden’s exclusive state license. The question was whether the federal government had the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate
the coasting trade and, if so, whether that power was exclusive of
state legislation on the same subject.102
The attorneys argued about the nature of the state’s police
powers and their relationship to the Commerce Clause. All agreed
on the principle. Daniel Webster, arguing for Gibbons, made the
case for the exclusivity of the federal commerce power, but argued
that an exclusive power was not inconsistent with the state’s recognized power over “pilot laws, the health laws, or quarantine

99 Professor David Currie argued that the Court never provided explicit and clear
answers to the exclusivity question. See, for example, David P. Currie, The Constitution
in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years, 1789–1888 168–76, 204–06, 222–34, 330–
42 (Chicago 1985). However, this Article’s examination of the cases suggests that there
was much more unanimity on the question than has been traditionally believed.
100 22 US (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
101 Id at 1–2.
102 Id at 196–97, 199–200.
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laws; and various regulations of that class.”103 Webster thought
that “all these things were, in their general character, rather regulations of police than of commerce, in the constitutional understanding of that term.”104
Webster recognized that such police regulations could affect
commerce, but argued that this effect did not make them by nature commercial regulations. “[G]enerally speaking,” he explained, “roads, and bridges, and ferries, though, of course, they
affect commerce and intercourse, do not obtain that importance
and elevation, as to be deemed commercial regulations. . . . Quarantine laws, for example, may be considered as affecting commerce; yet they are, in their nature, health laws.”105
How does one reconcile the exercise of these two powers,
which can sometimes touch on the same subjects? Webster argued
that it depended on the genuineness of the purpose for which the
state was regulating: “While a health law is reasonable, it is a
health law; but if, under colour of it, enactments should be made
for other purposes, such enactments might be void.”106
Thomas Oakley, arguing for Ogden, agreed that internal
state regulations might “indirectly affect the right of commercial
intercourse between the States,” but so do “quarantine laws, inspection laws, duties on auctions, licenses to sell goods, &c,” all of
which “are acknowledged to be valid.”107 It is the purpose for which
they are enacted that makes them valid: “They are passed, not
with a view or design to regulate commerce, but to promote some
great object of public interest, within the acknowledged scope of
State legislation: such as the public health, agriculture, revenue,
or the encouragement of some public improvement.”108 Thus,
“[b]eing passed for these legitimate objects, they are valid as internal regulations, though they may incidentally restrict or regulate
foreign trade, or that between the States.”109
William Wirt, Attorney General of the United States, replied
for Gibbons. Importantly, the case was also litigated under the
Patent Clause, which grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the
103

Id at 3, 18.
Gibbons, 22 US (9 Wheat) at 19.
105 Id at 20 (emphasis in original).
106 Id.
107 Id at 71–72.
108 Gibbons, 22 US (9 Wheat) at 72.
109 Id (emphasis added). Thomas Emmett, also arguing for Ogden, made the less persuasive argument that these police powers were also regulations of commerce and thus
the power over interstate commerce must be concurrent. Id at 112–13.
104
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Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”110 New York claimed that its grant of
a monopoly was like a patent, intended to protect and benefit the
inventor of a novel and useful method of transportation, the
steam engine.111 The same arguments about exclusivity were
made about the Patent Clause. The Attorney General argued:
It might be admitted, that the State had authority to prohibit
the use of a patented machine on that ground, or of a book,
the copy-right of which had been secured, on the ground of its
impiety or immorality. But the laws which are now in judgment were not passed upon any such ground. The question
raised by them is, can the States obstruct the operation of an
act of Congress, by taking the power from the National Legislature into their own hands? Can they prohibit the publication of an immoral book, licensed by Congress, on the pretext
of its immorality, and then give an exclusive right to publish
the same book themselves?112
Wirt thus implied that if the state regulation were genuinely
for the purpose of suppressing immorality, within the traditional
police power, then it could have been valid even if it affected Congress’s power over discoveries and inventions. Although he did
not make the point explicitly in the context of the commerce
power, there, too, he argued that “quarantine laws, and other regulations of police, respecting the public health in the several
States,” are not truly commercial regulations, suggesting again
that so long as the intent is not to regulate commerce under pretext of such regulation, it would be valid.113
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court makes good
sense in light of these arguments. After finding that the power
over commerce includes navigation and that Congress had exercised its power by providing for the licensing of the coasting
trade,114 he addressed the power of states to regulate on similar
subjects. Marshall did not deny that inspection laws had a considerable impact on commerce, but their “object” was not commerce; their object was “to improve the quality of articles

110
111
112
113
114

US Const Art I, § 8, cl 8.
Gibbons, 22 US (9 Wheat) at 5–6.
Id at 176 (emphasis added).
Id at 178.
Id at 189–97.
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produced by the labour of a country; to fit them for exportation;
or, it may be, for domestic use”; such regulations “act upon the
subject before it becomes an article of foreign commerce, or of commerce among the States, and prepare it for that purpose.”115 Quarantine laws and “health laws of every description” were similar.116
Marshall agreed that so long as the state laws were passed
for those noncommercial purposes, they could not be considered
impermissible regulations of commerce. “So, if a State, in passing
laws on subjects acknowledged to be within its control, and with
a view to those subjects, shall adopt a measure of the same character with one which Congress may adopt,” Marshall explained,
“it does not derive its authority from the particular power which
has been granted [the commerce power], but from some other [the
police power], which remains with the State, and may be executed
by the same means.”117 It was the purpose for which the laws were
enacted that determined the source of the power. Marshall, to be
sure, never quite answered whether the commerce power was exclusive because even if the state had a concurrent power, Congress’s own law directly conflicted with, and thus preempted, the
state regulation.118
Justice William Johnson concurred and argued that the Commerce Clause was exclusive. He, too, explained that the distinction between proper and improper state regulations touching on
the same subjects of the commerce power was the purpose for
which those state regulations were enacted:
It is no objection to the existence of distinct, substantive powers, that, in their application, they bear upon the same subject. The same bale of goods, the same cask of provisions, or
the same ship, that may be the subject of commercial regulation, may also be the vehicle of disease.119
Thus “the health laws that require them to be stopped and ventilated, are no more intended as regulations on commerce, than the
laws which permit their importation, are intended to innoculate
the community with disease.”120 It is the purpose and frank exercise of power that marks a valid police regulation: “Their different
115

Gibbons, 22 US (9 Wheat) at 203.
Id.
117 Id at 204 (emphasis added).
118 Id at 209–10 (holding that the exclusive license was in direct conflict with, and
thus preempted by, Congress’s legislation).
119 Gibbons, 22 US (9 Wheat) at 235 (Johnson concurring).
120 Id.
116
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purposes mark the distinction between the powers brought into
action; and while frankly exercised, they can produce no serious
collision.”121
By 1824, in summary, the Court was monitoring the boundaries of a state’s exercise of its legitimate police powers when that
power acted on the same subjects as the federal commerce power.
The states were not generally limited to reasonable police regulations, but they were specifically limited to such reasonable regulations if those regulations also affected interstate commerce.
Considering the reasonableness of the regulation, and the genuineness of the state’s purpose, was how the Court ensured that
the states were not improperly trying to regulate interstate commerce—a power that the Court at least assumed might belong exclusively to Congress.
2. Willson v Black Bird Creek Marsh Co (1829).
Willson v Black Bird Creek Marsh Co,122 decided only five
years after Gibbons, also suggested that the federal commerce
power was exclusive but that the states could make reasonable
police regulations that happened to affect interstate commerce.123
In Willson, the state of Delaware had authorized the construction
of a dam in a navigable stream. The owners of a sloop licensed
under the federal navigation laws damaged the dam in order to
pass it. When the corporation that had constructed the dam sued
for damages, the owners of the sloop defended on the grounds that
the dam had been unlawfully constructed because Delaware’s law
was an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce.124
US Attorney General Wirt defended the state law, arguing
that the dam was constructed upon “one of those sluggish reptile
streams, that do not run but creep, and which, wherever it passes,
spreads its venom, and destroys the health of all those who inhabit its marshes.”125 He therefore rejected the assertion “that a
law authorising the erection of a dam, and the formation of banks
which will draw off the pestilence, and give to those who have
before suffered from disease, health and vigour, is unconstitutional.”126 Chief Justice Marshall agreed that “[t]he value of the
121
122
123
124
125
126

Id (emphasis added).
27 US (2 Pet) 245 (1829).
Id at 251–52.
Id at 245–46.
Id at 249.
Willson, 27 US (2 Pet) at 249.
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property on its banks must be enhanced by excluding the water
from the marsh, and the health of the inhabitants probably improved.”127 Focusing on the legitimate purpose for which the state
had exercised its police powers, Marshall upheld the statute:
“Measures calculated to produce these objects, provided they do
not come into collision with the powers of the general government,
are undoubtedly within those which are reserved to the states.”128
Marshall thus again implied that measures calculated to interfere with commerce as opposed to those calculated to advance a
genuine police-power purpose might be invalid.
The difference between Willson and Gibbons was that in
Willson there was no federal statute involved at all. Marshall
thus observed that the authorization to construct the dam could
not “be considered as repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state.”129 This holding—and Justice
Johnson’s agreement with the opinion, as he did not write separately—suggests further movement in the direction of federal exclusivity over commerce. But so long as the state’s action was for
a genuine police-power purpose, and so long as it was genuinely
“calculated to produce” the legitimate ends of the police power, it
was valid. Thus, it might be said that by 1829 state regulations
affecting interstate commerce, irrespective of whether Congress
had also regulated on the subject, were required to be genuinely
for police-power purposes. Federal law overrode such proper state
laws only in the event of a direct conflict, such as was found in
Gibbons.130

127

Id at 251.
Id (emphasis added).
129 Id at 252 (emphasis added).
130 In Justice Joseph Story’s 1833 Commentaries, he summarized the general consensus on the Commerce Clause. The power is “exclusive” because what Congress chooses not
to regulate is as much part of its system as that which it chooses to regulate: “Regulation
is designed to indicate the entire result, applying to those parts, which remain as they
were, as well as to those, which are altered”; the power to regulate “produces a uniform
whole, which is as much disturbed and deranged by changing, what the regulating power
designs to have unbounded, as that, on which it has operated.” Joseph Story, 2 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 513 (Hilliard, Gray 1833). As for the states’
powers over “certain subjects, having a connexion with commerce,” such powers “are entirely
distinct in their nature from that to regulate commerce.” Id at 514–15. Health, inspection,
and pilotage laws “are not so much regulations of commerce, as of police.” Id at 515.
128
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3. Other cases through 1867.
At issue in the 1837 case of Mayor, Aldermen, and Commonalty of the City of New York v Miln131 was a state law requiring
ship captains to provide lists of their passengers, with the ostensible purpose of helping the state keep immigrants from becoming
public charges.132 The majority opinion—only Justice Joseph
Story dissented and Justice Smith Thompson concurred—held
that whether or not the commerce power was exclusive, the state’s
law was a legitimate exercise of the police power.133
Critically, the Court examined the purpose of the statute and
the ends sought to attain that purpose. “To decide” whether the
regulation was “not of commerce, but police,” Justice Philip
Barbour wrote, “let us examine its purpose, the end to be attained, and the means of its attainment.”134 The Court thought it
“apparent” that the “object” of the legislature was “to prevent New
York from being burdened by an influx of persons brought thither
in ships, either from foreign countries, or from any other of the
states,” and “to prevent them from becoming chargeable as paupers.”135 The Court held “that both the end and the means here
used, are within the competency of the states,”136 that the purpose
of the legislature was in fact to secure the protection of those residing in New York and to provide for their welfare, and that the
means were appropriate for those ends.137
The Court then summed up the existing state of the doctrine:
From this it appears, that whilst a state is acting within the
legitimate scope of its power as to the end to be attained, it
may use whatsoever means, being appropriate to that end, it
may think fit; although they may be the same, or so nearly
the same, as scarcely to be distinguishable from those
adopted by congress acting under a different power: subject,
131
132
133

36 US (11 Pet) 102 (1837).
Id at 130–31, 133.
Id at 132:

We shall not enter into any examination of the question whether the power to
regulate commerce, be or be not exclusive of the states, because the opinion
which we have formed renders it unnecessary: in other words, we are of opinion
that the act is not a regulation of commerce, but of police; and that being thus
considered, it was passed in the exercise of a power which rightfully belonged to
the states.
134
135
136
137

Id at 132–33.
Miln, 36 US (11 Pet) at 133.
Id.
Id at 133–34.
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only, say the Court, to this limitation, that in the event of collision, the law of the state must yield to the law of congress.138
In sum, whether or not the commerce power was exclusive, the
states had a different source of power—the police power—that
could act on the same subjects as Congress’s power over commerce. Such acts “within the legitimate scope of [state] power”
were valid unless in direct conflict with a congressional regulation of commerce.
The debate over the exclusivity of the commerce power flared
up again in the License Cases139 and the Passenger Cases140 in the
late 1840s. The former involved the power of states to prohibit
entirely the sale of liquor within their borders notwithstanding a
congressional law authorizing their importation from abroad.141
The power of the states was affirmed, but there was a series of
different opinions. Although Chief Justice Roger Taney seemed to
believe that states had plenary power to regulate commerce until
Congress acted, at least four of the justices argued that state laws
for the protection of health or morals were valid exercises of police
powers rather than regulations of commerce.142
The Passenger Cases involved state laws charging ship captains a fee per passenger, and these laws were struck down by a
vote of 5–4.143 The three-justice plurality argued that the commerce power was exclusive, but that states could make police regulations affecting commerce. Even though “[a] State cannot regulate foreign commerce,” Justice John McLean explained, “it may
do many things which more or less affect it.”144 Whether a regulation was a police or commercial one depended on its objective. In
this case, the law in question was “called a health law,” but to so
call it “would seem to be a misapplication of the term.”145 Indeed,
some of the funds went to a juvenile reform society.146 Justice
McLean thus inquired into the “objects and means” of the law and

138

Id at 137.
46 US (5 How) 504 (1847).
140 48 US (7 How) 283 (1849).
141 License Cases, 46 US (5 How) at 574 (Taney).
142 See id at 581 (Taney); id at 595 (McLean); id at 630 (Woodbury); id at 631–32
(Grier). For a brief summary of the various opinions, see Currie, The Constitution in the
Supreme Court at 225–26 (cited in note 99).
143 Passenger Cases, 48 US (7 How) at 392–93, 409.
144 Id at 402.
145 Id at 403.
146 Id.
139
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found them wanting.147 He concluded: “The police power of the
State cannot draw within its jurisdiction objects which lie beyond
it. It meets the commercial power of the Union in dealing with
subjects under the protection of that power, yet it can only be exerted under peculiar emergencies and to a limited extent.”148 “In
guarding the safety, the health, and morals of its citizens, a State
is restricted to appropriate and constitutional means.”149
The legitimate scope of the police power continued to play a
role up through the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although the doctrine was in a state of evolution, as late as 1867
in Steamship Co v Portwardens,150 the Court unanimously recognized that “some [state] powers, the exercise of which may, in various degrees, affect commerce, have always been held not to be
within the grant to Congress,” and “[t]o this class it is settled belong quarantine and other health laws, laws concerning the domestic police, and laws regulating the internal trade of a State.”151
The Court concluded in that case that a direct tax imposed by
Louisiana upon every entering ship could not be sustained on any
of these grounds and was therefore an invalid direct regulation of
commerce.152
C.

Obligations of Contract

In the antebellum period there was another prominent legal
doctrine requiring courts occasionally to inquire into the legitimate police-power purposes of legislative acts. This doctrine prevented states from impairing the obligations of existing contracts,
stemming from the federal Constitution’s Contracts Clause153 or
similar prohibitions in state constitutions. The context of these
disputes usually arose when a state granted a private corporation
a charter and subsequently sought to make regulations that
might affect the private corporation’s existing rights under the
charter. The doctrine maintained that so long as an exercise of
state power was genuinely for a police-power purpose, the state

147

Passenger Cases, 48 US (7 How) at 404.
Id at 408.
149 Id.
150 73 US (6 Wall) 31 (1867).
151 Id at 33.
152 Id at 33–34.
153 US Const Art I, § 10, cl 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”).
148
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could modify the rights and privileges of a corporation notwithstanding any existing charter.
Such was the prominent case of Thorpe v Rutland & Burlington
Railroad Co,154 decided by Vermont’s highest court. The case “involve[d] the question of the right of the legislature to require existing railways to respond in damages for all cattle killed or injured by their trains until they erect suitable cattle-guards at
farm-crossings.”155 There would have been no serious doubt as to
the state’s power to enact such a law if the requirement had already existed in the corporation’s charter or by virtue of the “general laws of the state at the date of the charter.”156
The court analyzed the case under a police-powers framework. “We think the power of the legislature to control existing
railways in this respect, may be found in the general control over
the police of the country, which resides in the law-making power
in all free states.”157 “This police power of the state extends to the
protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within the state.”158 It is
“within the range of legislative action to define the mode and
manner in which every one may so use his own as not to injure
others” according “to the maxim, Sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas.”159 Thus, the court concluded that “the authority of the
legislature to make the requirement of existing railways may be
vindicated, because it comes fairly within the police of the
state.”160 Other courts took a similar approach to the issue,161 as
154

27 Vt 140 (1855).
Id at 142.
156 Id.
157 Id at 149.
158 Thorpe, 27 Vt at 149.
159 Id.
160 Id at 156.
161 See, for example, Galena & Chicago Union Railroad Co v Loomis, 13 Ill 548,
550 (1852):
155

That the legislature has the power, by the enactment of general laws, from time
to time, as the public exigencies may require, to regulate corporations in the
exercise of their franchises, so as to provide for the public safety, admits of no
doubt. The provision in question is a mere police regulation, enacted for the protection and safety of the citizens of the country, and in no manner interferes with
or impairs the powers conferred on the defendants in their act of incorporation.
See also, for example, Inhabitants of Veazie v Mayo, 45 Me 560, 564 (1858) (“[I]ndependent
of and aside from all charter provisions, it is only the exercise of that police power which
is always necessarily retained by the people in their sovereign capacity, for the security of
the public safety, and of which they cannot be divested by legislative enactment or chartered immunities.”).
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did the US Supreme Court in Charles River Bridge v Warren
Bridge.162
Then-attorney Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr provided a succinct
summary of these contract and commerce doctrines in a footnote
to the 1873 edition of Chancellor James Kent’s Commentaries,
which he edited.163 After Kent’s discussion of the power of states
to regulate nuisances, slaughterhouses, and the like, Holmes provides the following comment:
This power of the government is now called the police power
. . . . But acts which can only be justified on the ground that
they are police regulations, must be so clearly necessary to
the safety, comfort, or well-being of society, or so imperatively
required by the public necessity, that they must be taken to
be impliedly excepted from the words of the constitutional
prohibition.164
Holmes then described the contract and commerce cases.165
Thus, Holmes, who dissented in Lochner,166 agreed that legislative acts requiring a police-power justification “must be so
clearly necessary” to those powers.167 But this requirement only
existed when those acts otherwise might run into conflict with
constitutional prohibitions, namely the Contracts Clause or Commerce Clause. The states were not limited to reasonable exercises
of the police powers when their exercise of power did not come
into potential collision with federal constitutional rights.

162 36 US (11 Pet) 420 (1837). In that case, the Court held that Massachusetts could
authorize the construction of the Warren Bridge between Boston and Charlestown, even
though it had previously granted a charter to the Charles River Bridge Company to construct a bridge between the two towns. See id at 536–38, 548–53. The Court held there
was no impairment of contractual obligations, even though the new bridge would significantly diminish the value of the previous charter, because “by legal intendments and mere
technical reasoning,” the corporation cannot take away from the state “any portion of that
power over their own internal police and improvement, which is so necessary to their well
being and prosperity.” Id at 552.
163 James Kent, 2 Commentaries on American Law 441 n 2 (Little, Brown 12th ed
1873) (Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, ed).
164 Id, citing Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 572–97 (cited in note 3)
and Thorpe, 27 Vt 140.
165 Kent, 2 Commentaries on American Law at 441 n 2 (cited in note 164).
166 Lochner, 198 US at 74 (Holmes dissenting).
167 Kent, 2 Commentaries on American Law at 441 n 2 (cited in note 164).
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D. Vested Rights and Pro- and Antislavery Constitutionalism
There are two cases that are often believed to be exceptions
to the claim of the preceding sections, in which antebellum courts
appear to have adopted a substantive version of due process of
law. In Wynehamer, the New York Court of Appeals invalidated a
state prohibition on liquor as applied to liquor that existed before
the statute’s enactment.168 Professor James Ely described this
case as “the first time that a court determined that the concept of
due process prevented the legislature from regulating the beneficial enjoyment of property in such a manner as to destroy its
value.”169 The other case is infamous for advancing a vision of substantive due process at the federal level: Dred Scott, in which the
Court held that Congress could not, without violating due process
of law, prohibit slave owners from carrying their slave property
into the federal territories.170
Several points distinguish these two cases from the other
cases on which scholars have relied for antebellum support for
economic substantive due process. First, even if these two cases
were valid exceptions, they would only apply in an incredibly
small subset of cases involving the total prohibition on possessing
a species of property that had been obtained lawfully under previously existing laws. Most of the police-power cases involving
regulations on butchering, selling in the market, and freedom of
contract simply do not invoke this issue.
Second, these two cases seem to have misunderstood the
“vested rights” doctrine on which they were based. This doctrine
prohibited legislatures from taking away a particular person’s

168 Wynehamer, 13 NY at 392–93, 395–96, 405–06. But even here the court was at least
arguably trying to apply the standard vested rights doctrine. See, for example, id at 393:

The true interpretation of these constitutional phrases is, that where rights are
acquired by the citizen under the existing law, there is no power in any branch
of the government to take them away; but where they are held contrary to the
existing law, or are forfeited by its violation, then they may be taken from him—
not by an act of the legislature, but in the due administration of the law itself,
before the judicial tribunals of the state. The cause or occasion for depriving the
citizen of his supposed rights must be found in the law as it is, or, at least it
cannot be created by a legislative act which aims at their destruction.
169
170

Ely, Guardian of Every Other Right at 80 (cited in note 19).
Dred Scott, 60 US (19 How) at 450:

[A]n act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty
or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed no offence against
the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.
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property that had already “vested.” As Professors Chapman and
McConnell explain, that is perfectly consistent with the procedural understanding of due process: a legislature cannot take
property that has vested in A and give it to B. Property rights can
only be arranged prospectively by general, standing laws.171 To be
sure, sometimes the vested rights doctrine was invoked to overturn even apparently prospective legislation. Perhaps the most
famous example is Hoke v Henderson.172 North Carolina had previously had a statute granting court clerks tenure during “good
behaviour,” and the petitioner had held his office pursuant to that
statute.173 At issue in Hoke was a new statute requiring elections
for court clerks. The North Carolina Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional, observing that it could “operate prospectively” as a regulation “for future appointments and future enjoyment”; but “[a]s to those to whom the grant was made for life, an
estate, a property vested; which cannot be divested without default or crime.”174 Therefore, even in Hoke, although the court may
have gotten the lower-order result wrong, it at least believed that
it was simply applying the traditional vested rights doctrine.
Wynehamer and Dred Scott were the first cases to hold that
there were some types of property that could not be prohibited by
legislation at all. These courts simply got the vested rights doctrine wrong. As Justice Cooley explained in his treatise, many liquor prohibitions had been sustained by state courts. As a result
of this legislation, “the merchant of yesterday becomes the criminal of to-day, and the very building in which he lives and conducts
the business which to that moment was lawful becomes perhaps
a nuisance, if the statute shall so declare, and liable to be proceeded against for a forfeiture.”175 Legislatures were allowed to
prohibit certain species of property, though perhaps there had to
be a legitimate police-power purpose for doing so.176
171 See, for example, Chapman and McConnell, 121 Yale L J at 1712 (cited in note 1)
(“The contours of this argument suggest that ‘general law’ interpretations of state law-ofthe-land and due process clauses are not as different in basic rationale from the ‘procedural’ or ‘vested rights’ interpretations as some commentators have suggested.”); id at
1726 (arguing that “courts applied due process to . . . [legislative] acts that operated to
deprive specific persons of liberty or vested property rights”).
172 15 NC (4 Dev) 1 (1833).
173 Id at 11.
174 Id at 21.
175 Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 584 (cited in note 3).
176 As Cooley wrote, vested rights were those “which it is equitable the government
should recognize, and of which the individual cannot be deprived without injustice.” Id at
358. See also John Harrison, Legislative Power and Judicial Power, 31 Const Commen
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Third, these two cases were widely condemned at the time.
Professor John Hart Ely argued that “Wynehamer and the Dred
Scott reference were aberrations, neither precedented nor destined to become precedents themselves,” and that “[o]ther courts
on which they were urged were quite acid in the judgment that
they had misused the constitutional language by giving it a substantive reading.”177
To be sure, some scholars have argued that these cases reflected a changed public understanding of due process as a result
of antislavery ideology.178 This began when the proponents of slavery argued that depriving masters of their slave property by law
would be to deprive them of property without due process of law.179
They made this argument in support of their agenda to deny Congress any power to prohibit slavery in the territories or the District of Columbia, notwithstanding Congress’s clear power to
make all “needful”180 regulations for the territories and to exercise
“exclusive”181 legislation over the District.
The antislavery advocates struck back. If anything, slavery
itself violates due process because it deprives the slave of liberty
and their property in their own labor, with no process at all. Professor Barnett has catalogued many antislavery constitutionalists making such arguments.182 For example, Theodore Dwight
Weld argued in 1838, “All the slaves in the District have been
‘deprived of liberty’ by legislative acts. Now, these legislative acts

295, 297 (2016) (arguing that under the nineteenth-century doctrine of vested rights,
“courts held that some legal interests were immune from change by legislation enacted
after the interest was created,” but this doctrine “protected only some legal interests, interests that were identified on grounds of justice and the public good”).
177 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 16
(Harvard 1980).
178 See, for example, Jacobus tenBroek, Equal Under Law 50–51, 121–22 (Collier
1965). See also Howard Jay Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth
Amendment, in Everyman’s Constitution: Historical Essays on the Fourteenth Amendment,
the “Conspiracy Theory”, and American Constitutionalism 152–241 (Heffernan 1968). Professor Robert Cover, on the other hand, has argued that the scholars who have claimed
the Fourteenth Amendment was an affirmation of antislavery constitutional thought rely
on a minority of antislavery thinkers whose constitutional views were not widely shared.
Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process 154–55 (Yale 1975).
179 See tenBroek, Equal Under Law at 42 (cited in note 178).
180 US Const Art IV, § 3, cl 2.
181 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 17.
182 Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes Section One? The Abolitionist Origins of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 3 J Legal Analysis 165, 174–246 (2011).
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‘depriving’ them ‘of liberty,’ were either ‘due process of law,’ or
they were not.”183 Alvan Stewart wrote in 1837:
[T]he true and only meaning of the phrase, “due process of
law,” is an indictment or presentment by a grand jury, of not
less than twelve, nor more than twenty-three men; a trial by
a petit jury of twelve men, and a judgment pronounced on the
finding of the jury, by a court;
and, of course, “there is not a slave at this moment, in the United
States” who had become a slave according to these procedures.184
William Goodell similarly argued that any person “deprived
of liberty without indictment, jury trial, and judgment of Court,
is therefore UNCONSTITUTIONALLY deprived of liberty.”185 In the
context of the fugitive slave laws, Salmon P. Chase argued, “Now,
unless it can be shewn that no process of law at all, is the same
thing as due process of law, it must be admitted that the act which
authorizes seizure without process, is repugnant to a constitution
which expressly forbids it.”186 The Republican Party platform of
1860 summed this all up: because the Founding Fathers “ordained that ‘no persons should be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,’ . . . we deny the authority of
Congress, of a territorial legislature, or of any individuals, to give
legal existence to slavery in any territory of the United States.”187
These abolitionist arguments about the meaning of due process do not seem to support substantive due process at all. Every
single statement from these famous abolitionists relies entirely
on the procedural understanding of due process. Indeed, slaves
became slaves by no order of any court. More still, they violated
no preexisting law. They became slaves simply because the law
directed that the mere existence of these individuals was sufficient to render them subject to the forced violence of slavery. But
183 Theodore Dwight Weld, The Power of Congress over the District of Columbia 40
(Trow 1838).
184 Alvan Stewart, A Constitutional Argument, on the Subject of Slavery (originally
published 1837), in Howard L. Lubert, Kevin R. Hardwick, and Scott J. Hammond, eds,
The American Debate over Slavery, 1760–1865: An Anthology of Sources 159, 160–61
(Hackett 2016).
185 William Goodell, Views of American Constitutional Law, in Its Bearing upon American Slavery 61 (Lawson & Chaplin 2d ed 1845).
186 Salmon P. Chase, An Argument for the Defendant, Submitted to the Supreme Court
of the United States, at the December Term, 1846, in the Case of Wharton Jones v John
Vanzandt 89 (R.P. Donogh 1847).
187 Republican Party Platform of 1860, Declaration 8 (American Presidency Project,
2019), archived at https://perma.cc/24PM-KYH6.
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surely the requirement of a general law means that someone
must have it within his power not to violate that law at all and
thus to avoid the punishment. Otherwise the requirement for
preexisting, established law is a mockery. Put another way, a law
that punishes for an immutable characteristic is not “law” within
the procedural meaning of due process of law.
In sum, in the antebellum period, it would appear that state
legislatures were not generally limited to reasonable exercises of
the police power. They were only so limited when their exercise of
power came into potential conflict with express constitutional
prohibitions, most prominently against regulating interstate
commerce or impairing the obligations of contract. At most, two
cases were widely understood to adopt a version of substantive
due process. Yet these two cases applied to a narrow set of circumstances (the total abolition of certain types of property),
rested on a misunderstanding of the vested rights doctrine, and
were generally disapproved. Further, the arguments rooted in antislavery constitutionalism were consistent with the procedural
understanding of due process even if they were thought to be radical at the time.
II. REHABILITATING COOLEY
The preceding Part examined three prominent legal doctrines
involving police powers in the antebellum period. First, state
courts could invalidate municipal laws if they were unreasonable,
in restraint of trade, not for genuine police-power purposes, or beyond the powers delegated to them by the state.188 Second, federal
courts could invalidate state laws affecting interstate commerce
if they were not genuinely for police-power purposes.189 Third,
courts could inquire into the purposes of state legislation affecting
existing contracts.190 Yet no court seems to have invalidated state
legislative acts for being unreasonable, in restraint of trade, or in
excess of legitimate police powers when they involved only internal matters or internal commerce and affected no existing contractual obligations.191 Indeed, the few cases we have seen on
point suggested that state courts would not have invalidated such

188
189
190
191

See Part I.A.
See Part I.B.
See Part I.C.
See Part I.D.

2020]

The Origins of Substantive Due Process

853

state legislation even if they believed them to be unreasonable or
improper exercises of the police power.192
This Part examines Justice Cooley’s renowned 1868 Treatise
on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the Legislative
Power of the States of the American Union. Examining Cooley’s
treatise is useful because it was the most wide-ranging and influential treatise on American law in the year of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s adoption.193 It is thus good evidence of what doctrines of American law may have informed the language of that
amendment.
Additionally, many proponents of substantive due process of
the police-power variety rely on Cooley’s treatise as evidence that
the concept existed in American law prior to the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment.194 For example, Professor James Ely describes Cooley as “the most influential constitutional writer of the
late nineteenth century,” and argues he “embraced a substantive
understanding of due process in his landmark work,” namely that
due process “was intended to safeguard individuals from the arbitrary exercise of governmental power.”195 Professor Williams describes Cooley similarly as “[b]y far the most influential of the
early post–Civil War commentators to address the meaning of due
process and law-of-the-land provisions.”196 He contends that
“Cooley’s focus on the legitimacy of the legislature’s objectives and
the means pursued to attain those objectives corresponds closely
with the police powers version of due process that predominated
during the Lochner era,” and that “Cooley is frequently credited
as one of the principal intellectual forerunners of Lochner-era
substantive due process jurisprudence.”197 Professor Mayer cites
Cooley for the proposition that “state courts in the nineteenth century understood the general regulatory power of the states known
as the ‘police power’ to be broad but certainly not unlimited.”198

192

See Part I.A.2.
See note 32. Additionally, Professor Alan Jones has explained that the treatise
“went through six editions, and had a broader circulation, greater sale, and was more frequently cited than any other book on American law published in the last half of the nineteenth century.” Alan Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”: A
Reconsideration, 53 J Am Hist 751, 759 (1967).
194 For a fuller citation to such scholars than what is provided below, see note 32.
195 Ely, 16 Const Commen at 342 (cited in note 3).
196 Williams, 120 Yale L J at 493 (cited in note 2).
197 Id at 494.
198 Mayer, 36 Hastings Const L Q at 233 & n 71 (cited in note 3).
193
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Even Professor David Currie, who was by no means sympathetic to this version of substantive due process, claimed that
Cooley “further propagated” in his “influential treatise in 1868”
the proposition that the Due Process Clause could be used to
“strike down federal statutes on the ground that they were substantively objectionable.”199 “If it were necessary to name the principal contributor to the cause of constitutional laissez faire in the
era following the Civil War,” wrote Professor Clyde Jacobs,
“Thomas M. Cooley would deserve such designation.”200 Perhaps
the most sustained commentary of this sort comes from Professor
Harry Scheiber’s entry on state police power in The Encyclopedia
of the American Constitution:
Of basic importance to Cooley’s view of the limitations that
ought to confine the power of state legislatures was his premise that the “due bounds of legislative power” were not set
alone by “express constitutional provisions.” The implied limitations that he believed ought to apply all hinged on a generalized “due process” concept. Due process, he contended,
forbade enactment of what he termed “class legislation” (laws
imposing burdens or granting privileges to specific groups or
interests that were arbitrarily singled out instead of being
“reasonably” classified). Moreover, his generous definition of
due process would forbid laws that were “arbitrary and unusual [in] nature,” and as such “unknown to the law of the
land.”201
Cooley has been misunderstood. It is the burden of this Part
to rehabilitate him.202 Although isolated sentences from Cooley’s

199

Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court at 365 & n 11 (cited in note 99).
Jacobs, Law Writers and the Courts at 27 (cited in note 17).
201 Harry N. Scheiber, State Police Power, in Leonard W. Levy and Kenneth L. Karst,
eds, 5 Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 2505, 2508 (Macmillan 2d ed 2000) (alteration in original).
202 As far as I have been able to discover, the last serious attempt at reinterpreting
Cooley along less laissez-faire lines was Jones’s 1967 article. See Jones, 53 J Am Hist at
751 (cited in note 193). He observed that Cooley “showed considerable respect for legislative discretion,” and that he may have anticipated Professor James Bradley Thayer as a
leading nineteenth-century defender of judicial restraint. Id at 762–63. Even Jones, however, argued that Cooley did propound a kind of substantive due process. Id at 761:
200

Cooley was settling the general rule that any action so arbitrary in its effect
upon individuals as to stand apart from the established usages of AngloAmerican law could not be dignified as “due process of law” or as the “law of the
land” in any government claiming to be constitutional. . . . By making this substantive meaning of due process Cooley provided an authoritative definition by
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treatise might seem to support a police-power version of substantive due process, his treatise tracks the legal doctrines described
in Part I. More still, Cooley elsewhere in his treatise expressly
disavows the power of courts to strike down legislation for substantive unreasonableness absent some explicit constitutional
provision. At most, Cooley suggests that antebellum courts used
a version of substantive due process as a rule of statutory construction, much like the Illinois court did in Rumpff.203
A.

The Police Powers
1. Municipal governments.

Cooley’s treatise contains an entire chapter on the limitations
on municipal governments.204 The powers of such governments
are to be strictly construed according to the delegations of power
from the states.205 And municipal bylaws must be reasonable;
“[w]henever they appear not to be so, the court must, as a matter
of law, declare them void.”206 Critically, to be reasonable they
must genuinely tend toward the accomplishment of the purposes
for which the municipal corporation exists: “To render them reasonable, they should tend in some degree to the accomplishment
of the objects for which the corporation was created and its powers
conferred.”207 Thus, if a bylaw
assumes to be a police regulation, but deprives a party of the
use of his property without regard to the public good, under
the pretence of the preservation of health, when it is manifest
that such is not the object and purpose of the regulation, it
will be set aside as a clear and direct infringement of the
right of property without any compensating advantages.208

which judges could find a written constitutional limitation to various types of
legislative action.
See also id at 760 (similar).
203 See notes 87–96 and accompanying text.
204 Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 189–255 (cited in note 3).
205 See id at 195 (“And the general disposition of the courts in this country has been
to confine municipalities within the limits that a strict construction of the grants of powers
in their charters will assign to them; thus applying substantially the same rule that is
applied to charters of private incorporation.”).
206 Id at 200.
207 Id at 200–01.
208 Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 203 (cited in note 3).
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Under these principles, municipalities have the power to prohibit the carrying on of dangerous occupations, but if they permit
such activities they must be equally available to all who desire to
participate in them.209 Their bylaws cannot be in restraint of
trade.210 When they have authority to order the cleansing or
abatement of slaughterhouses, they cannot entirely prohibit
slaughterhouses from particular sections of the town.211
2. State governments.
Much later in his work, Cooley provides a chapter on the “police powers of the states” themselves.212 It is here we encounter
the other two prevailing antebellum doctrines. Cooley’s chapter
deals with two questions: the first arising from the “conflict between national and State authority,” and the second involving
“whether the State exceeds its just powers in dealing with the
property and restraining the actions of individuals.”213
Cooley defines the police power of a state as “its system of
internal regulation, by which it is sought not only to preserve the
public order and to prevent offences against the State, but also”—
and here is the key passage—
to establish for the intercourse of citizen with citizen those
rules of good manners and good neighborhood which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, and to insure to each
the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, so far as is reasonably consistent with a like enjoyment of rights by others.214
This is a statement of general principle. State power exists only
for the benefit, and not the oppression, of the subjects. But Cooley

209

Id at 201:

And if a corporation has power to prohibit the carrying on of dangerous occupations within its limits, a by-law which should permit one person to carry on such
an occupation and prohibit another, who had an equal right, from pursuing the
same business, or which should allow the business to be carried on in existing
buildings, but prohibit the erection of others for it, would be unreasonable.
210

Id at 202:

So a by-law to be reasonable should be in harmony with the common law. If it is
in general restraint of trade,—as a by-law that no person shall exercise the art
of painter in the city of London, not being free of the company of painters,—it
will be void on this ground.
211
212
213
214

Id at 204 n 2.
Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 572–97 (cited in note 3).
Id at 572.
Id.
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here says nothing about a court’s power to enforce these principles of free government as the court happens to see them. Indeed,
the only authority Cooley quotes that bears on that question suggests the opposite:
The power we allude to is rather the police power; the power
vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain,
and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without,
not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be
for the good and welfare of the Commonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same.215
Here there is little to suggest a judicial authority to enforce the
reasonableness of a state’s exercise of its police powers.
Cooley next discusses the relationship of the police powers to
the commerce power. “One of the most important questions respecting this power, in a constitutional point of view, concerns
those cases over which jurisdiction is vested in the national government, whereby, it is sometimes claimed, that the police jurisdiction of the State is necessarily excluded.”216 Here Cooley encapsulates the doctrine described in Part I: “It is plain, however, from
a statement of the theory upon which the police power rests, that
any proper exercise of it by the State cannot come in conflict with
the provisions of the Constitution of the United States.”217 Cooley
subsequently refers to the License Cases and explains that the
complete prohibition on liquor has sometimes been argued to
“conflict with the Federal Constitution” (that is, the commerce
power), but that such regulations “are but the ordinary police regulations, such as the State may make in respect to all classes of
trade or employment.”218 Most of Cooley’s chapter is devoted to the
relationship of the police powers to the commerce power.219
In between two separate discussions of the commerce power,
Cooley mentions the relationship of the police powers to the obligations of contract. “[I]t has been invariably held that [the Contracts Clause] does not so far remove from State control the rights
and properties which depend for their existence or enforcement

215 Id at 573 (emphasis added), quoting Commonwealth v Alger, 61 Mass (7 Cush) 53,
84–85 (1851).
216 Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 574 (cited in note 3).
217 Id (emphasis added).
218 Id at 581.
219 See id at 584–94.
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upon contracts,” Cooley explains, “as to relieve them from the operation of such general regulations for the good government of the
State and the protection of the rights of individuals as may be
deemed important.”220 Thus, the rights conferred on private corporations “are subject to such new regulations as from time to
time may be made by the State with a view to the public protection, health, and safety, and to properly guard the rights of other
individuals and corporations.”221
“The limit to the exercise of the police power in these [contract] cases must be this,” Cooley summarizes: “[T]he regulations
must have reference to the comfort, safety, or welfare of society”
and “must not, under pretence of regulation, take from the corporation any of the essential rights and privileges which the charter
confers.”222 “In short,” Cooley adds, “they must be police regulations in fact, and not amendments of the charter in curtailment
of the corporate franchise.”223
In a particularly important passage, already mentioned
above, Cooley discusses police regulations like those involved in
the License Cases and Wynehamer that entirely destroy the value
of property or employment. Cooley explains the harm such regulations can do to individuals. The sale of liquor being lawful, and
the “capital employed in it being fully protected by law, the legislature then steps in, and, by an enactment based on general reasons of public utility, annihilates the traffic, destroys altogether
the employment, and reduces to a nominal value the property on
hand.”224 Thus, “the merchant of yesterday becomes the criminal
of to-day,” and where he lives or works “becomes perhaps a nuisance.”225 Cooley then maintains the following: “A statute which
can do this must be justified upon the highest reasons of public
benefit; but, whether satisfactory or not, they rest exclusively in the
legislative wisdom.”226
Here is a clear statement of a court’s power when a state legislative act does not interfere with interstate commerce and does
not impair any contractual obligations. Cooley’s synthesis is
directly opposed to the New York court’s conclusion in

220
221
222
223
224
225
226

Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 574 (cited in note 3).
Id at 576.
Id at 577.
Id (emphasis added).
Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 583–84 (cited in note 3).
Id at 584.
Id (emphasis added).
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Wynehamer and contradicts the substantive due process thesis.
Such matters are not for the courts to examine; they are matters
of legislative wisdom. The legislature may even entirely eliminate
traffic in and destroy the value of particular commodities.
In the last few pages of Cooley’s chapter, he observes that “[i]t
would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances in which
this [police] power is or may be exercised” because of the infinite
number of ways an individual’s exercise of rights “may conflict
with a similar exercise by others, or may be detrimental to the
public order or safety.”227 Cooley then mentions the destruction of
property for public purposes, the abatement of public nuisances,
the “preservation of the public morals,” and the regulations of
markets.228 What are the rules governing the exercise of this police power? “[W]e need not weary the reader with further enumeration,” Cooley writes, because many of these regulations “have
been previously referred to under the head of municipal
by-laws.”229
In sum, Cooley’s extended discussion of the police powers in
his treatise is consistent with the three antebellum legal doctrines described in Part I. None appears to support the concept of
substantive due process that has often been attributed to him.
B.

Due Process of Law and Arbitrary Power

Elsewhere in his treatise, Cooley discusses the scope and nature of legislative power, judicial power, and due process of law.
These discussions are further evidence that Cooley did not advance a substantive due process concept. In particular, Cooley
writes, consistently with Professors Chapman and McConnell,
that legislatures violate due process when they “assume to dispose of disputed rights,” in other words, when their acts are “in
the nature of a judicial decree” or are “plainly an attempted adjudication upon the rights of the parties concerned” to a particular
dispute.230 Legislative acts that “deprive parties of vested rights”
are “obnoxious.”231 The “chief restriction” imposed by the due process and law of the land clauses upon state governments is that
“vested rights must not be disturbed.”232
227
228
229
230
231
232

Id at 594.
Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 594–96 (cited in note 3).
Id at 596.
Id at ix, 104, 105.
Id at 355.
Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 357–58 (cited in note 3).
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Nor can legislatures abrogate a fundamental minimum of
procedure: “[I]t would not be competent for the legislature to authorize a court to proceed and adjudicate upon the rights of parties, without giving them an opportunity to be heard before it,”
writes Cooley, “and, for the same reason, it would be incompetent
for it, by retrospective legislation, to make valid proceedings
which had been had in the courts, but which were void for want
of jurisdiction over the parties.”233 Judicial process may change
from time to time, “but only with due regard to the old landmarks
established for the protection of the citizen.”234 These prohibitions
are only “substantive” in the rather uninteresting sense that they
apply to the legislature, which of course they must if the particular process required by “due process of law” cannot be abridged by
legislative enactments.235
Cooley does have a tantalizing paragraph about arbitrary
power. Cooley writes that “the whole community is also entitled
at all times to demand the protection of the ancient principles
which shield private rights against arbitrary interference, even
though such interference may be under a rule impartial in its
application.”236 Cooley relies on Bank of Columbia v Okely237 for
this proposition—the same case on which Professors Barnett and

233

Id at 107.
Id at 356.
235 The passage quoted by Currie for the proposition that Cooley supported judicial
review of the substantive reasonableness of legislation, Currie, The Constitution and the
Supreme Court at 365 & n 11 (cited in note 99), also does not seem to substantiate that
proposition. Cooley states:
234

When the government, through its established agencies, interferes with the title
to one’s property, or with his independent enjoyment of it, and its act is called in
question as not in accordance with the law of the land, we are to test its validity
by those principles of civil liberty and constitutional defence which have become
established in our system of law, and not by any rules that pertain to forms of
procedure merely.
Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 356 (cited in note 3). This passage, standing alone, says nothing at all about judicial review of the substantive reasonableness of
legislation. What principles of civil liberty and constitutional defense are established in
our system of law is exactly the question Cooley was examining. At the end of that same
paragraph, Cooley reiterates that due process of law “in each particular case means, such
an exertion of the powers of government as the settled maxims of law sanction, and under
such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as those maxims prescribe for the
class of cases to which the one in question belongs”—without stating what those maxims
or safeguards are. Id.
236 Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 355 (emphasis added) (cited in
note 3).
237 17 US (4 Wheat) 235 (1819); Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 355
n 3 (cited in note 3).
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Bernick rely for the proposition that “in America the due process
of law came to be understood as a guarantee against all arbitrary
government action.”238
Yet this case is consistent with a procedural understanding
of due process. The reference to arbitrary power means only that
the clause was “intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the
established principles of private rights and distributive justice.”239
That is, rule by mere will, as opposed to rule by established laws,
is arbitrary power. That was also John Locke’s definition of arbitrary power: “Absolute arbitrary Power” was “governing without
settled standing laws.”240 Men enter society to “preserve their
lives, liberties, and fortunes” and “to secure their peace and quiet”
by “stated rules of right and Property.”241 Locke opposed “absolute
arbitrary power over [men’s] persons and estates,” and thus “the
ruling power ought to govern by declared and received laws, and
not by extemporary dictates and undetermined resolutions.”242
Government power “ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure,
[but rather] exercised by established and promulgated laws.”243
Due process of law, simply put, prohibits arbitrary power—
arbitrary acts of the legislature that affect life, liberty, or property
contrary to the existing standing laws.
C.

Substantive Due Process as a Rule of Statutory
Construction

Cooley’s separate discussion of unequal and partial legislation does suggest that what we understand by “substantive due
process” may have played some kind of role in antebellum law: it
may have been a kind of rule of statutory construction, by which
courts presumed, when possible, that legislatures did not intend
to infringe the fundamental principles of free government. Cooley

238

Barnett and Bernick, 60 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1643 & n 261 (cited in note 5).
Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 355 (emphasis added) (cited in
note 3), quoting Okely, 17 US (4 Wheat) at 244.
240 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government in John Locke, Two Treatises of
Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration 160 (Yale 2003) (Ian Shapiro, ed) (originally published 1690) (emphasis added).
241 Id at 161.
242 Id.
243 Id. See also id at 160 (“The legislative, or supreme authority cannot assume to
itself a power to rule by extemporary, arbitrary decrees; but is bound to dispense justice,
and decide the rights of the subject, by promulgated, standing laws, and known authorized
judges.”).
239
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was particularly concerned with class legislation.244 In that context, he used the term “arbitrary” more expansively: “The doubt
might also arise whether a regulation made for any one class of
citizens, entirely arbitrary in its character, and restricting their
rights, privileges, or legal capacities in a manner before unknown
to the law, could be sustained, notwithstanding its
generality.”245
Unreasonable distinctions, Justice Cooley says, would transcend the proper exercise of legislative power even if there were no
express constitutional prohibition:

244

Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 391–92 (cited in note 3):

[E]very one has a right to demand that he be governed by general rules, and a
special statute that singles his case out as one to be regulated by a different law
from that which is applied in all similar cases would not be legitimate legislation, but an arbitrary mandate, unrecognized in free government.
Here again Cooley seems to use the term “arbitrary” in the sense in which Locke did, and
he in fact immediately cites Locke for the proposition that legislators “are to govern by
promulgated, established laws, not to be varied in particular cases.” Id at 392, quoting
Locke, Second Treatise of Government at 163 (cited in note 240). The two principal cases
that Cooley cites in support of these statements also stand for the proposition that courts
cannot divest individuals of vested rights by special and partial legislation. Cooley quotes
Wally’s Heirs v Kennedy, 10 Tenn (2 Yer) 554, 555 (1831):
The rights of every individual must stand or fall by the same rule or law, that
governs every other member of the body politic, or land, under similar circumstances; and every partial, or private law which directly proposes to destroy or
affect individual rights, or does the same thing by affording remedies leading to
similar consequences, is unconstitutional and void.
Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 392 n 2 (cited in note 3). He also quotes
Lewis v Webb, 3 Me 326, 336 (1825), for the proposition that
it can never be within the bounds of legitimate legislation, to enact a special law,
or pass a resolve dispensing with the general law, in a particular case, and granting a privilege and indulgence to one man, by way of exemption from the operation and effect of such general law, leaving all other persons under its operation.
Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 392 n 2 (cited in note 3). But this case,
too, involved a direct legislative interference with vested rights. An individual liable to
another party by the decree of a probate court, from which appeal was only allowed within
a short period of time, persuaded the state legislature to enact a special law permitting
him to appeal the decree five years after it issued and the rights to the parties had vested.
Lewis, 3 Me at 326–27. This was held to be a violation of the other parties’ right to have
their interests adjudicated according to the “due course of law.” Id at 335. “If by such a
legislative act as the resolve in question, an existing absolute decree or judgment could be
vacated, and persons interested therein be deprived of their rights in this summary manner,” the court asked, “what security does the citizen enjoy in virtue of the section of the
declaration of rights before cited, viz.: ‘Every person for an injury done him in his person,
reputation, property or immunities, shall have remedy by due course of law?’” Id, quoting
Me Const Art I, § 19 (1819).
245 Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 393 (emphasis added) (cited in
note 3).
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[B]ut if the legislature should undertake to provide that persons following some specified lawful trade or employment
should not have capacity to make contracts, or to receive conveyances, or to build such houses as others were allowed to
erect, or in any other way to make such use of their property
as was permissible to others, it can scarcely be doubted that
the act would transcend the due bounds of legislative power,
even if it did not come in conflict with express constitutional
provisions. The man or the class forbidden the acquisition or
enjoyment of property in the manner permitted to the community at large would be deprived of liberty in particulars of
primary importance to his or their “pursuit of happiness.”246
This may come close to substantive due process, and this
chapter has often been cited in support of it.247 But Cooley goes on
to say that at most courts must charitably interpret such legislative acts. Because “[e]quality of rights, privileges, and capacities
unquestionably should be the aim of the law,” when “special privileges are granted, or special burdens or restrictions imposed in
any case,” it then
must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as
little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The State, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow,
and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are obnoxious, and discriminations against
persons or classes are still more so, and as a rule of construction are always to be leaned against as probably not contemplated or designed.248
There can be no question that Cooley believed that an arbitrary governmental restriction would be contrary to the “fundamental maxim” of free government, and “transcend the due
bounds of legislative power.” But all courts could do in the face of
such arbitrary and unreasonable legislation was to presume that
the legislature intended minimal deviations from that maxim
and, if possible, strictly construe the legislation.249 As explained
246

Id (first emphasis added).
See, for example, Gillman, The Constitution Besieged at 58 (cited in note 3) (quoting from the passages described here).
248 Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 393 (emphases added) (cited in
note 3).
249 In one case that Cooley cites in his text, the author of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court’s opinion explicitly states, “If the legislature should pass a law in plain, unequivocal,
and explicit terms, within the general scope of their constitutional power,” there is no
247
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by one court Cooley cites: “All the Courts can do with odious statutes which are constitutional, is, to chasten their harshness by
construction.”250 Cooley’s comments on judicial review assert even
more explicitly that it is not for courts to second-guess legislative
judgments when such judgments are not in violation of any express constitutional provision.251
governmental authority “to pronounce such an act void, merely because, in the opinion of
the judicial tribunals, it was contrary to the principles of natural justice.” Id at 168 n 1,
quoting Commonwealth v McCloskey, 2 Rawle 369, 373 (Pa 1830).
250 Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 168 n 1 (cited in note 3), quoting
Beebe v State, 6 Ind 501, 528 (1855).
251 In passages rarely quoted in the relevant literature, Cooley expressly declares that
a court cannot hold “a statute unconstitutional and void, solely on the ground of unjust
and oppressive provisions, or because it is supposed to violate the natural, social, or political rights of the citizen, unless it can be shown that such injustice is prohibited or such
rights guaranteed or protected by the constitution.” Id at 164. It is true, he acknowledges,
that some judges “have been understood to intimate a doctrine different from what is here
asserted,” but Cooley asserts that their statements in such cases are made “rather by way
of argument and illustration, . . . to induce a more cautious and patient examination of the
statute, with a view to discover in it, if possible, some more just and reasonable legislative
intent.” Id at 164–65. Such statements were not made for the purpose of “laying down a
rule by which courts would be at liberty to limit, according to their own judgment and
sense of justice and propriety, the extent of legislative power in directions in which the
constitution had imposed no restraint.” Id at 165.
Cooley then summarizes:
[T]here would, as it seems to us [Cooley], be very great probability of unpleasant
and dangerous conflict of authority if the courts were to deny validity to legislative action on subjects within their control, on the assumption that the legislature had disregarded justice or sound policy. The moment a court ventures to
substitute its own judgment for that of the legislature, in any case where the
constitution has vested the legislature with power over the subject, that moment
it enters upon a field where it is impossible to set limits to its authority.
Id at 167–68. Cooley immediately supports this proposition with further discussion also
worth quoting at length:
The rule of law upon this subject appears to be, that, except where the constitution has imposed limits upon the legislative power, it must be considered as
practically absolute, whether it operate according to natural justice or not in any
particular case. The courts are not the guardians of the rights of the people of
the State, unless those rights are secured by some constitutional provision which
comes within the judicial cognizance. The remedy for unwise or oppressive legislation, within constitutional bounds, is by an appeal to the justice and patriotism of the representatives of the people. If this fail, the people in their sovereign
capacity can correct the evil; but courts cannot assume their rights. The judiciary
can only arrest the execution of a statute when it conflicts with the constitution.
It cannot run a race of opinions upon points of right, reason, and expediency with
the law-making power. Any legislative act which does not encroach upon the
powers apportioned to the other departments of the government, being prima
facie valid, must be enforced, unless restrictions upon the legislative power can
be pointed out in the constitution, and the case shown to come within them.
Id at 168 (citations omitted).
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III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND THE POLICE POWERS
Soon after the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption, the Supreme Court began to conflate the three antebellum doctrines.
With citations to contracts, commerce, and municipal cases, all of
the justices assumed that state legislatures were generally limited to legitimate exercises of their police powers. This conflation
occurred in all of the opinions in the Slaughter-House Cases and
also in Mugler v Kansas.252 By the time of Lochner, a general
police-powers limitation on state legislatures had become firmly
rooted in constitutional jurisprudence.
This Part tables the Slaughter-House Cases because they
were litigated largely under the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
As I shall subsequently claim, a police-powers analysis may very
well be relevant to this clause, and therefore the police powers
may have been appropriately deployed in those cases. This Part
thus begins with post–Slaughter-House cases under the Due
Process Clause to show how the Supreme Court conflated the antebellum doctrines under the guise of “due process of law.” It concludes by returning to some modern scholars who may also be
misinterpreting these antebellum cases.
A.

Barbier, Mugler, and Lochner

Police powers featured in the due process context in Justice
Stephen Field’s brief opinion in Barbier v Connolly.253 The Court
held that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses “undoubtedly intended . . . [to guarantee] that there should be no arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of
property,” and, among other guarantees, “that no impediment
should be interposed to the pursuits of any one except as applied
to the same pursuits by others under like circumstances.”254 But
the Fourteenth Amendment was not “designed to interfere with
the power of the State, sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals,

252

123 US 623, 8 S Ct 273 (1887).
113 US 27 (1885). The case involved a municipal prohibition on “carry[ing] on the
washing and ironing of clothes in public laundries and wash-houses, within certain prescribed limits of the city and county, from ten o’clock at night until six o’clock on the morning of the following day.” Id at 30. The Court held that the “provision is purely a police
regulation within the competency of any municipality possessed of the ordinary powers
belonging to such bodies.” Id.
254 Id at 31.
253
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education, and good order of the people.”255 Here we see the Court
begin to deploy a concept of substantive due process—legislatures
may only act consistently with the police powers.
The Court’s next comprehensive examination of due process
and the police powers did not occur until Mugler. In Mugler, a
state constitutional provision prohibited the sale of all liquor in
the state unless the seller was licensed and such sale was for scientific or medical purposes.256 Mugler had built and owned a
brewery before the state’s constitution was amended, and the
question was whether such a prohibition on sale violated the
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of due process and equal
protection.257 Counsel for the state argued first. The right to use
alcohol was specifically “limited by the police power of the
state.”258 In support of that proposition, the attorney cited to Commerce Clause cases prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment.259 “All rights are held subject to the police power,”
he went on to argue, which “extends to the right to regulate, prohibit, and suppress the liquor traffic.”260 For this proposition counsel cited the License Cases and Judge Dillon’s treatise, as well as
cases involving contractual obligations.261
Mugler’s counsel also responded in the language of police
powers. He claimed that “[t]he right of the state to prohibit unwholesome trades, etc., is based on the general principle that
every person ought to so use his own as not to injure his neighbors,” and that this was “the police power.”262 He then cited to the
License Cases, to Corfield v Coryell,263 and finally to Cooley’s passage that due process of law “means such an exertion of the power
of government as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction,
and under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights

255

Id.
Mugler, 123 US at 654–56.
257 Id at 625, 656–57.
258 Mugler, 8 S Ct at 285.
259 Id at 286, citing, for example, License Cases, 5 How at 631.
260 Mugler, 8 S Ct at 287.
261 Id, citing People v Hawley, 3 Mich 330 (1854), and Commonwealth v Tewksbury,
52 Mass (11 Met) 55 (1846).
262 Mugler, 8 S Ct at 288.
263 6 F Cases 546, 551–52 (CC ED Pa 1825). Corfield was a widely cited case decided
by Justice Bushrod Washington riding circuit that elaborated upon the meaning of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the original US Constitution.
256
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as those maxims prescribe.”264 He also cited to vested-rights due
process cases.265
Thus, Mugler’s counsel argued that the state cannot use its
power to regulate to “deprive the citizen of the lawful use of his
property, if it does not injuriously affect or endanger others. . . .
Nor can it, in the exercise of the police power, enact laws that are
unnecessary, and that will be oppressive to the citizen.”266 “The
state could only restrain this right by virtue of the police power,
which could only be exercised to the extent reasonable and necessary for the preservation and promotion of the morals and health of
the people of Kansas.”267 Counsel made several similar observations,268 for one of which he cited to Cooley’s treatise.269
Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote for the Court. That the
prohibition “does not necessarily infringe any right, privilege, or
immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States, is
made clear by the decisions of this court, rendered before and
since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,” Harlan
wrote.270 He then proceeded to discuss the scope of the police powers under the Commerce Clause cases.271 After citing to the earlier
Fourteenth Amendment case of Munn v Illinois,272 Harlan asked:
264 Mugler, 8 S Ct at 288–89, citing License Cases, 5 How at 583, Corfield, 6 F Cases
at 546, and Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 356 (cited in note 3).
265 Mugler, 8 S Ct at 289, citing Wynehamer, 13 NY at 432, and Hoke, 15 NC (4 Dev)
at 15.
266 Mugler, 8 S Ct at 289.
267 Id at 291.
268 See id:

The police power cannot go beyond the limit of what is necessary and reasonable
for guarding against the evil which injures or threatens the public welfare in the
given case, and the legislature, under the guise of that power, cannot strike down
innocent occupations and destroy private property, the destruction of which is
not reasonably necessary to accomplish the needed reform.
Id at 292 (citations and emphasis omitted):
The state cannot enact laws, not necessary to the preservation of the health and
safety of the community, that will be oppressive and burdensome to the citizen.
The constitutional guaranty of life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness is not limited by the temporary caprice of a present majority, and can be limited only by
the absolute necessities of the public. No proposition is more firmly established
than that the citizen has the right to adopt and follow such lawful and industrial
pursuit, not injurious to the community, as he may see fit.
269 Id at 292, citing Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations
Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 110, 445, 446
(Little, Brown 5th ed 1883).
270 Mugler, 123 US at 657.
271 Id at 657–59, discussing the License Cases, 46 US (5 How) at 504.
272 94 US (4 Otto) 113 (1876).
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“But by whom, or by what authority, is it to be determined
whether the manufacture of particular articles of drink, either for
general use or for the personal use of the maker, will injuriously
affect the public?”273 Harlan at first said this was a matter for the
legislative branch.274 Yet, he added:
It does not at all follow that every statute enacted ostensibly
for the promotion of these ends, is to be accepted as a legitimate exertion of the police powers of the State. There are, of
necessity, limits beyond which legislation cannot rightfully
go. . . . If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the
public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and
thereby give effect to the Constitution.275
Harlan relies on Barbier for support,276 discusses a series of
obligations of contract cases,277 and then quotes Patterson v
Kentucky278 for the proposition that state legislation “strictly and
legitimately for police purposes, does not, in the sense of the Constitution, necessarily intrench upon any authority which has been
confided, expressly or by implication, to the national government.”279 Patterson was a case about the Patent Clause, addressing the question reserved by the Court in Gibbons,280 and the
Court relied on the Commerce Clause precedents.281 In Mugler,
the Court ultimately held that no statute can “come within the
Fourteenth Amendment, in any case, unless it is apparent that
its real object is not to protect the community, or to promote the
273
274

Mugler, 123 US at 660.
Id at 661:

Under our system that power is lodged with the legislative branch of the government. It belongs to that department to exert what are known as the police powers of the State, and to determine, primarily, what measures are appropriate or
needful for the protection of the public morals, the public health, or the public
safety.
275

Id.
Id at 663, citing Barbier, 113 US at 31.
277 Mugler, 123 US at 664–65, discussing Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House and LiveStock Landing Co v Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Co, 111 US
746, 751 (1884), Stone v Mississippi, 101 US 814, 816 (1879), and New Orleans Gas-Light
Co v Louisiana Light & Heat Manufacturing Co, 115 US 650, 672 (1885).
278 97 US 501 (1878).
279 Mugler, 123 US at 665–66, quoting Patterson, 97 US at 504.
280 See notes 100–121 and accompanying text.
281 Patterson, 97 US at 501–04.
276
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general well-being, but, under the guise of police regulation, to
deprive the owner of his liberty and property, without due process
of law.”282
By the time of Lochner, the police-powers doctrine was well
entrenched. It was no surprise, then, that Justice Rufus Peckham
observed that “there is a limit to the valid exercise of the police
power by the State.”283 It was incumbent upon the Court to ascertain whether a legislative act was “a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police power of the State,” or rather “an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right
of the individual to his personal liberty or to enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him appropriate or
necessary for the support of himself and his family.”284
In sum, after the Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court,
under the Due Process Clause, conflated the antebellum legal doctrines to conclude that the states themselves were limited to
legitimate exercises of the police power.
B.

Modern Revisionists

It now bears a brief mention that many of the substantive
due process scholars with which this Article began285 may also be
conflating these antebellum doctrines. Professor Howard Gillman
maintains that antebellum state courts would “uphold legislation
that (from their perspective) advanced the well-being of the community as a whole or promoted a true ‘public purpose,’” while they
would “strike down legislation that (from their perspective) was
designed to advance the special or partial interests of particular
groups or classes.”286 For this proposition he cites a variety of contracts cases, municipal cases, and vested rights cases, in addition
to extensively citing Cooley.287
Professor Mayer similarly cites a combination of these kinds
of cases for the proposition that there was a “long history of substantive due process protections for liberty and property rights—
a body of law concerning constitutional limits on government
282

Mugler, 123 US at 669.
Lochner, 198 US at 56.
284 Id.
285 See note 3.
286 Gillman, The Constitution Besieged at 10 (cited in note 3).
287 See id at 45–60. Specifically, see id at 47–48, discussing Charles River Bridge (contract case); id at 51–52, discussing Vadine’s Case, 23 Mass (6 Pick) 187 (1828) (municipal
bylaw case); id at 53, discussing Wally’s Heirs v Kennedy, 10 Tenn 554 (1831) (vested rights
case); id at 55–59, discussing Justice Cooley.
283
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police powers that was well-established by the late nineteenth
century.”288 According to Mayer, the Lochner-era Court “was
merely enforcing these traditional constitutional limits on the
scope of the police power.”289 For the more specific proposition that
“[i]n a series of decisions from the 1790s to the 1850s, the highest
courts of several states held that the law of the land clause in
their state constitutions prohibited the legislature from passing
laws that deprived citizens of their property,” Mayer cites to a
municipal corporations case, a takings case, and two vested rights
cases.290
Most recently, Professors Barnett and Bernick also rely on
these same kinds of cases, and particularly municipal corporations cases. In their paper, they argue that antebellum courts protected not only vested rights but also developed a kind of policepowers version of due process. They write that “courts became
more willing to look beyond the face of enactments to discern and
evaluate the propriety of legislative ends” after the enactment of
the Fourteenth Amendment, but that “there was continuity as
well.”291 “Long before the Lochner era, antebellum courts repeatedly affirmed that legislative power was inherently limited by the
ends for which legitimate governments are established” and that
legislatures could only put constraints on life, liberty, or property
to “protect the community, or to promote the general wellbeing.”292 The police power, in other words, “was understood to be
limited by its functions—the protection of health, safety, and morals of the public.”293 For this proposition they cite to Austin v
Murray,294 which we encountered above and which involved the
invalidation of Charlestown’s bylaw prohibiting the bringing of
the dead into the town.295 And for the proposition that class distinctions or deprivations needed to be “reasonably calculated to

288

Mayer, 60 Mercer L Rev at 571, 586–89, 594, 603 (cited in note 3).
Id at 571.
290 Id at 587 & n 104, citing Zylstra v Corporation of Charleston, 1 SCL (1 Bay) 382
(SC Com Pl 1794) (municipal corporations case); Lindsay v Commissioners, 2 SCL (2 Bay)
38 (SC Const App 1796) (takings case), Trustees of the University of North Carolina v Foy,
5 NC (1 Mur) 58 (1805) (vested rights case), and Bowman v Middleton, 1 SCL (1 Bay) 252
(SC Com Pl 1792) (vested rights case).
291 Barnett and Bernick, 60 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1636 (cited in note 5).
292 Id, quoting Mugler, 123 US at 669.
293 Barnett and Bernick, 60 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1637 (cited in note 5).
294 33 Mass (16 Pick) 121 (1834).
295 See notes 63–71 and accompanying text.
289
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serve proper ends,”296 they cite what appears to be a Commerce
Clause case and a vested rights case.297
In short, many modern scholars appear to make the same
move the Court made in the 1870s and after. Citing a host of
municipal corporations, negative commerce, and contracts
cases—as well as Cooley’s treatise—they conclude that states
were generally limited to reasonable exercises of the police power.
IV. PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES AND INCORPORATED RIGHTS
The antebellum doctrines call into question claims of substantive due process scholars who contend that the seeds of a
police-power version of substantive due process were sown by the
time of, and aided by, Justice Cooley’s well-known treatise. The
doctrines demonstrate that, quite instead of being rooted in antebellum cases or Cooley’s treatise, the concept arose as the Supreme Court conflated the three antebellum doctrines after the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
There may, of course, be other reasons to adopt substantive
due process today of the kind that limits the acts of state governments. For example, state legislatures today engage in much the
same kinds of activities in which local governments used to engage. Much economic legislation now originates at the state level.
Because of the implications for liberty and property, this transference of activity from the local to the state level may supply a
normative reason for why courts ought to police this kind of legislation for substantive unreasonableness. However, this rationale would not have jurisprudential support in the history.
What mattered to the early courts was the unit of government
doing the legislating, not the nature of the legislation; hence a
state legislature could ratify the unreasonable act of a municipal
corporation.298

296

Barnett and Bernick, 60 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1637 & n 227 (cited in note 5).
Vanderbilt v Adams, 7 Cow 349, 351 (NY 1827) (upholding a statute allowing municipal authorities to regulate river traffic only because it was an exercise of police power
“calculated for the benefit of all”); Baggs’s Appeal, 43 Pa 512, 515 (1862):
297

Any form of direct governmental action on private rights, which, if unusual, is
dictated by no imperious public necessity, or which makes a special law for a
particular person, or gives directions for the regulation and control of a particular case after it has arisen, is always arbitrary and dangerous in principle, and
almost always unconstitutional.
298

See notes 82–85 and accompanying text.
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Although the antebellum cases probably do not support substantive due process, the police powers could play a new and important role as a result of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Prior to that amendment, the only two regularly litigated
federal constitutional prohibitions on the states were the Commerce and Contracts Clauses. After the amendment, the federal
Constitution imposed new prohibitions on the states, most pertinently the Privileges or Immunities Clause and incorporated
rights. This Part considers how a police-powers analysis might
function in cases involving these new federal constitutional prohibitions, by analogy to the Commerce and Contracts Clause jurisprudence. Part IV.A examines how the police powers could affect a Privileges or Immunities Clause analysis, whether under a
fundamental-rights reading or an antidiscrimination reading of
the clause. It suggests that, on either reading, a genuine and reasonable exercise of the police power might serve as a defense to a
claim of abridgement, as it served as a defense to a claim that the
state had improperly regulated interstate commerce or impaired
existing contractual obligations. Part IV.B then shows how the
Slaughter-House Cases can be—and ought to be—reimagined
along these lines. Part IV.C then aims to show how the police
powers could also be used as a defense against claims of abridging
or infringing incorporated rights; indeed, the Supreme Court
adopted just this kind of an analysis in First Amendment cases
in the first few decades after that right was incorporated.
A.

Two Views of Privileges or Immunities

The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment declares: “No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States.”299 There is a debate in the literature about
whether the privileges and immunities of citizens protected by
this clause include only federal rights, or also state-defined civil
rights like contract and property rights. Most scholars agree that
the clause referred at a minimum to state-defined rights and that
Justice Samuel Miller was incorrect in the Slaughter-House Cases
to limit the clause only to the privileges of national citizenship.300
299

US Const Amend XIV, § 1, cl 2.
See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) at 74. For scholarship criticizing Justice Miller’s approach, consider Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The
Presumption of Liberty 199 (Princeton 2004); Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme
Court at 344–51 (cited in note 99); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or
300
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Assuming that the clause includes state-defined privileges
like the right to contract and acquire property, there are then at
least two possible readings of the clause. Professors David
Currie,301 John Harrison,302 and Christopher Green303 have advanced the view that the Privileges or Immunities Clause principally required nondiscrimination in the provision of privileges or
immunities defined by state law. According to this view, it is entirely up to the states to define what privileges or immunities they
wish to give their citizens. But whatever such privileges they do
give, they must do so equally to all citizens.304 In contrast, the fundamental rights view of the clause maintains that the privileges
or immunities of state citizenship are fundamental and cannot be
defined by the state at all in any way that diminishes them.305
Under either reading of the clause, the police-powers analysis
could be relevant. This clause was now a limitation on the states
just as were the Contracts and Commerce Clauses. Therefore, if
the clause prohibits the states from acting in a certain manner,
the states might, by analogy, defend their actions on the grounds
that they are not abridging privileges or immunities but rather
acting in legitimate pursuit of their police powers. Thus, under
the fundamental rights reading, just as states cannot regulate
commerce or impair contractual obligations, they cannot abridge
fundamental rights; but, as in the other two contexts, the states
can make legitimate police regulations. With the addition of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause to the Constitution, courts easily
could have said that states could not abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens, but that legitimate police regulations are not
abridgements.
Immunities Clause, 101 Yale L J 1385, 1414–16 (1992). For scholarship defending Miller’s
approach, see Kurt T. Lash, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities of American Citizenship 47–66, 252–65 (Cambridge 2014) (arguing that antebellum
law distinguished between privileges of citizens of states and those privileges of national
citizenship, and defending the Slaughter-House majority opinion on that ground).
301 See Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court at 347 (cited in note 99).
302 See Harrison, 101 Yale L J at 1422–24 (cited in note 300).
303 See Christopher R. Green, Equal Citizenship, Civil Rights, and the Constitution: The
Original Sense of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 4–8, 97–102, 117–19 (Routledge 2015).
304 See id at 43, 85, 97–102; Harrison, 101 Yale L J at 1416–24 (cited in note 300).
Professor Philip Hamburger is less explicit about whether states could define the content
of those privileges, but agrees that the thrust of the clause was to ensure that whatever
rights were guaranteed to white citizens under Article IV’s Privileges or Immunities Clause
would now be guaranteed to black citizens, too, under the Fourteenth Amendment. Philip
Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 Nw U L Rev 61, 113–15, 133–34, 143 (2011).
305 See, for example, Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution at 60–68 (cited in note
300); Lash, 106 Georgetown L J at 1459–60, 1464–66 (cited in note 4).
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The police powers could work similarly under the antidiscrimination reading. An antidiscrimination reading would prohibit arbitrary, but not all, discriminations. That is why a child
may not be permitted to drink alcohol or drive a car: such discriminations are genuinely connected to a legitimate police-power purpose. A legitimate police regulation would militate against a finding of discrimination, and vice versa. In this context, the police
powers would play a more restrained role than they would under
the fundamental rights reading because there would have to be
inequality for the clause to be triggered at all.
Importantly, under either reading the police-powers framework would be significantly narrower than under a general rule
limiting states to proper exercises of the police power. By analogy
to the commerce or contracts cases, the state would only be limited if the privileges or immunities of citizenship were involved,
and only if there was a potential for an abridgement of them.
Thus, the analysis would be limited to situations involving fundamental rights or discrimination. If neither condition obtained,
the states would likely not be limited to proper exercises of the
police power.
B.

The Slaughter-House Cases

The Slaughter-House Cases may now be seen in a new light.
In those cases, all the litigants and justices relied on commerce,
contract, and municipal corporations cases for the proposition that
the states themselves were generally limited to genuine exercises
of the police power. Although the justices appear to have simply
conflated the various doctrines, their reasoning could be supported
by analogy to Contracts and Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
In the Slaughter-House Cases, the state legislature of Louisiana
granted a monopoly to one particular company for a period of
twenty-five years for both the landing of all animals in the city
and areas surrounding New Orleans, and also for the slaughtering of animals.306 This law effectively required one hundred butchers who had previously pursued slaughtering as their occupation
to close their businesses and slaughter only on the premises of the
favored company, to which they had to pay some amount of rent
and tribute.307 These provisions were challenged by counsel as

306

Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) at 36.
Id at 42, 48. See also id at 86 (Field dissenting) (suggesting as many as four hundred butchers may have been affected).
307
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creating a monopoly in violation of common law; as violating the
Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on involuntary servitude;
and as violating the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Due
Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.308
Although the majority of the Court upheld that statute, both
the majority opinion and each of the dissenting opinions relied on
the police powers.
1. The majority opinion.
The attorney for the butchers of New Orleans asked: “[W]hat
are ‘privileges and immunities’ in the sense of the Constitution?
They are undoubtedly the personal and civil rights which usage,
tradition, the habits of society, written law, and the common sentiments of people have recognized as forming the basis of the institutions of the country.”309 But it will surely be objected, he went
on to say, that such a law could be justified “as an exercise of the
police power; a matter confessedly, in its general scope, within the
jurisdiction of the States.”310 There was no doubt that “the subject
of sanitary laws belong to the exercise of the power set up; but it
does not follow there is no restraint on State power of legislation
in police matters.”311 In support of the limitation of police powers
on the states, counsel cited to Gibbons and the
Passenger Cases.312
In response to these arguments, Justice Miller for the Court
argued that “[t]he wisdom of the monopoly granted by the legislature may be open to question,” but “[t]he power here exercised
by the legislature of Louisiana is, in its essential nature, one
which has been, up to the present period in the constitutional history of this country, always conceded to belong to the States, however it may now be questioned in some of its details.”313 He then
discussed the general nature of the police powers of the states,
observing that they extend “to the protection of the lives, limbs,

308
309
310
311
312
313

Id at 43–44, 48–49 (majority).
Id at 55.
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) at 56.
Id.
Id at 56–57.
Id at 61–62 (emphasis in original).
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health, comfort, and quiet of all persons”—a quotation from
Thorpe, the contracts case out of Vermont.314
Miller stated that because regulations of slaughterhouses
were “among the most necessary and frequent exercises of this
power,” it was not necessary to seek “a comprehensive definition”
of the police power, “but rather look for the proper source of its
exercise.”315 He then launched into an extended discussion of
Gibbons, Miln, and other commerce cases.316 He concluded that
“the statute under consideration is aptly framed to remove from
the more densely populated part of the city, the noxious slaughter-houses, . . . and to locate them where the convenience, health,
and comfort of the people require they shall be located.”317 In language reminiscent of Miln, he wrote that “the means adopted
by the act for this purpose are appropriate, are stringent, and
effectual.”318
It is hardly clear that any of this analysis was necessary for
the disposition of the case. After all, Miller went on to state that
there was no violation of the Thirteenth Amendment,319 no violation of due process of law or equal protection,320 and that the Privileges or Immunities Clause only guarantees the privileges of national as opposed to state citizenship (and no one could claim that
the privilege of pursuing a particular occupation derived from the
federal government).321 Nevertheless, the police-powers analogy
seems sound. If the Privileges or Immunities Clause does require
equality in the provision of privileges and immunities defined by
state law, then surely a legitimate exercise of the police power
militates against a finding of impermissible discrimination.
2. Justice Field’s dissent.
Justice Field’s dissent also relied on a police-powers analysis
and the antebellum doctrines. “It is contended in justification for
the act in question,” Field wrote,
314 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) at 62, quoting Thorpe, 27 Vt at 149. See
also Part I.C.
315 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) at 63.
316 Id at 63–64.
317 Id at 64.
318 Compare id, with Miln, 36 US at 137 (“[W]hilst a state is acting within the legitimate scope of its power as to the end to be attained, it may use whatsoever means, being
appropriate to that end, it may think fit.”).
319 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) at 69.
320 Id at 80–81.
321 Id at 77–79.
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that it was adopted in the interest of the city, to promote its
cleanliness and protect its health, and was the legitimate exercise of what is termed the police power of the State. That
power undoubtedly extends to all regulations affecting the
health, good order, morals, peace, and safety of society, and
is exercised on a great variety of subjects, and in almost numberless ways. . . . But under the pretence of prescribing a police regulation the State cannot be permitted to encroach
upon any of the just rights of the citizen, which the Constitution intended to secure against abridgment.322
Field agreed that the provisions requiring the landing and
slaughtering of animals below the city of New Orleans, and the
inspection of animals, were legitimate police regulations, but “it
would not endanger the public health if other persons were also
permitted to carry on the same business within the same district
under similar conditions as to the inspection of the animals.”323
Such a deprivation, Field wrote, was a violation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. That clause “assumes that there are
such privileges and immunities which belong of right to citizens
as such, and ordains that they shall not be abridged by State legislation.”324 It “refers to the natural and inalienable rights which
belong to all citizens.”325 Field then proceeded to enumerate some
of these rights, first with a reference to the Civil Rights Act of
1866326 and then to Justice Bushrod Washington’s circuit opinion
in Corfield.327 “Clearly among these” privileges and immunities,
Field wrote, “must be placed the right to pursue a lawful employment in a lawful manner, without other restraint than such as
equally affects all persons.”328
Field contended that in so few instances had such fundamental privileges been so flagrantly violated, but whenever this had
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Id at 87 (Field dissenting).
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) at 87 (Field dissenting).
324 Id at 96.
325 Id.
326 Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat 27, codified as amended at 42 USC § 1981 et seq.
327 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) at 97 (Field dissenting) (explaining that
the privileges and immunities covered by Article IV are those that are “in their nature,
fundamental; which belong of right to citizens of all free governments,” and include “protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and
possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject,
nevertheless, to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general
good of the whole”), quoting Corfield, 6 F Cases at 551–52.
328 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) at 97 (Field dissenting).
323
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occurred, “the enactment interfering with the privilege of the citizen has been pronounced illegal and void.”329 For this proposition,
Field cited Rumpff—which we encountered previously330—and
two other municipal corporations cases,331 and he quoted one of
them for the proposition that bylaws must be reasonable.332 “In all
these cases there is a recognition of the equality of right among
citizens in the pursuit of the ordinary avocations of life, and a
declaration that all grants of exclusive privileges, in contravention of this equality, are against common right, and void.”333 Thus,
the states may only “prescribe such regulations for every pursuit
and calling of life as will promote the public health, secure the
good order and advance the general prosperity of society.”334
After raising Rumpff, Justice Field made the following
remark: “It is true that the court in this opinion was speaking of
a municipal ordinance and not of an act of the legislature of a
State.”335 Field observed, however, that “a legislative body is no
more entitled to destroy the equality of rights of citizens, nor to
fetter the industry of a city, than a municipal government. These
rights are protected from invasion by the fundamental law.”336
Field does not analogize to the Contracts and Commerce
Clauses explicitly and, indeed, his reliance on the municipal cases
appears to be misplaced. But his reasoning may nevertheless be
valid. Now that the states themselves are prohibited from abridging the privileges of citizens, perhaps the police-power limitation
now applies to the states as well. A legitimate exercise of the police power may now be a defense to a claim of abridgement.337

329

Id at 106.
See notes 87–96 and accompanying text.
331 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) at 106–09 (Field dissenting), discussing
Rumpff, Mayor of the City of Hudson v Thorne, 7 Paige Ch 261, 263 (NY Ch 1838), and
Norwich Gas Light Co v Norwich City Gas Co, 25 Conn 19 (1856).
332 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) at 109 (Field dissenting), quoting Thorne,
7 Paige at 263.
333 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) at 109 (Field dissenting).
334 Id at 110.
335 Id at 108.
336 Id.
337 Justices Joseph Bradley’s and Noah Swayne’s dissents also adopted the policepowers framework. The Louisiana legislation was enacted “under pretence of making a
police regulation for the promotion of the public health,” wrote Justice Bradley. SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) at 111 (Bradley dissenting). The Privileges or Immunities
Clause guarantees every citizen the right to pursue employment “subject to such reasonable regulations as may be prescribed by law.” Id at 112–14. “The right of a State to regulate the conduct of its citizens is undoubtedly a very broad and extensive one, and not to
be lightly restricted. But there are certain fundamental rights which this right of
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Incorporated Rights

The Fourteenth Amendment has also been interpreted as incorporating most of the Bill of Rights against the states. Whether
or not incorporation is correct as a matter of the amendment’s
original meaning is beyond the scope of this Article. But, taking
incorporation as given, the federal Bill of Rights now serves as a
source of new federal constitutional prohibitions against the
states. By analogy to the antebellum cases, the states ought to be
able to defend against claims of abridgement or infringement by
invoking their police powers.
Indeed, this framework for analyzing incorporated rights appears to have been the Court’s preferred approach in First
Amendment cases in the first few decades after that amendment
was incorporated. In Gitlow v New York,338 the 1925 case incorporating the First Amendment against the states, the Supreme
Court explicitly held that a proper exercise of the police powers
would insulate a state from challenge, and upheld the state statute precisely on that ground:
That a State in the exercise of its police power may punish
those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the
public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to
crime, or disturb the public peace, is not open to question. . . .
By enacting the present statute the State has determined,
through its legislative body, that utterances advocating the
overthrow of organized government by force, violence and unlawful means, are so inimical to the general welfare and involve such danger of substantive evil that they may be penalized in the exercise of its police power. That determination
must be given great weight. . . . And the case is to be considered “in the light of the principle that the State is primarily
the judge of regulations required in the interest of public
safety and welfare;” and that its police “statutes may only be
declared unconstitutional where they are arbitrary or

regulation cannot infringe.” Id at 114. The test to determine validity was whether the act
was a legitimate exercise of the police power. If “[i]t is onerous, unreasonable, arbitrary,
and unjust,” then “[i]t has none of the qualities of a police regulation,” but “[i]f it were
really a police regulation, it would undoubtedly be within the power of the legislature.” Id
at 119–20. Swayne’s analysis is less thorough, but his views are clear: “Liberty is freedom
from all restraints but such as are justly imposed by law.” Id at 127 (Swayne dissenting)
(emphasis added).
338 268 US 652 (1925).
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unreasonable attempts to exercise authority vested in the
State in the public interest.”
We cannot hold that the present statute is an arbitrary or
unreasonable exercise of the police power of the State unwarrantably infringing the freedom of speech or press; and we
must and do sustain its constitutionality.339
This police-powers framework, which the Court deployed in
subsequent cases,340 is quite different from modern First Amendment doctrine, which limits state regulations to certain “categorical” exceptions from the First Amendment orbit.341 At least historically, states would be able to attempt to justify any regulation
of speech or press on the grounds of the police power; the courts
would then ensure that their exercise of this power was genuine
and reasonable. On this reading, for example, prohibitions on
viewing animal crush videos or the sale of violent video games to
minors seem easy to sustain.342 And now that the Second Amendment has been incorporated against the states, this framework
could apply to such cases, too.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, scholars have debated the meaning of the
term “due process of law,” and whether it included a substantive
as well as procedural component. This Article has contributed to
this debate by approaching it from the other direction: Whence
did the postbellum concept of substantive due process derive?
This Article has shown that this concept does not appear to have
much direct support in the antebellum legal cases. Rather, substantive due process arose as the Court combined distinct doctrines—the common law of corporations as applied to municipal
governments and the Contracts and negative Commerce Clause
339

Id at 667–70 (internal citations omitted).
See, for example, Herndon v Georgia, 295 US 441, 445–46 (1935); Near v
Minnesota, 283 US 697, 707–08 (1931); Stromberg v California, 283 US 359, 368–69
(1931); Whitney v California, 274 US 357, 371–72 (1927).
341 See, for example, Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127
Yale L J 246, 263–64 (2017) (describing this approach and expressing doubt as to its consistency with original meaning); United States v Stevens, 559 US 460, 482 (2010) (striking
down a ban on viewing animal “crush videos”); id at 471 (observing that the First Amendment tiers of scrutiny analysis applies except to certain historical “categories of speech”
that are “fully outside the protection of the First Amendment”).
342 See Stevens, 559 US at 460; Brown v Entertainment Merchants Association, 564
US 786, 805 (2011) (striking down state legislation prohibiting the sale of violent video
games to minors).
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doctrines—under the general guise of due process of law after the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
For legal support, the proponents of substantive due process
must turn away from the Due Process Clause and toward the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. Depending on one’s reading of
that clause, limiting state power to legitimate exercises of police
powers may be enforceable as a matter of federal constitutional
law; at least, an improper exercise of the police powers would be
some evidence of an abridgement of the privileges or immunities
of citizenship, whatever those may be. But any such limitation on
state power would not derive from due process of law.

